Group Decision-Making by Cook, Edward
Virginia Commonwealth University 
VCU Scholars Compass 
Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 
2019 
Group Decision-Making 
Edward Cook 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd 
 Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Management Sciences 
and Quantitative Methods Commons, and the Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial 
Engineering Commons 
 
© The Author 
Downloaded from 
https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/5928 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at VCU Scholars Compass. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of VCU Scholars 
Compass. For more information, please contact libcompass@vcu.edu. 
 Group Decision-Making 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctorate of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
 
 
by 
 
Edward Lewis Cook 
Doctor of Philosophy in Systems Modeling and Analysis 
 
 
 
 
Director: Jason R. W. Merrick 
Professor, Department of Supply Chain Management & Analytics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
Richmond, Virginia 
April 2019 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Edward Lewis Cook  2019 
All Rights Reserved 
  
 iii 
 
Acknowledgement 
I would like to thank my daughters, Elizabeth, Caroline, and Anna, for their 
support and encouragement through the years of my studies.  Beginning with my 
deployment to the Green Zone in Baghdad where the idea to pursue this degree started 
and then continuing through the years of classes and research, they have suffered the 
loss of time with their father and yet have been encouraging and loving throughout.   I 
am also grateful for the guidance and tutelage and friendship of my advisor, Dr. Jason 
Merrick.  From the initial meeting soon after I returned to the US from Iraq still trying to 
adjust to life back home to the very last days of completing this work, he has been 
positive and encouraging and insightful.  What I have learned form him is incalculable 
and invaluable.  Finally, I need to thank Roxanne, my partner in life and in business.  
She is my Muse and my inspiration.  Anything good I have achieved flows from her. 
  
 iv 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Individual and Group Decisions ................................................................................ 1 
1.2. Decision Analysis for Group Decisions ..................................................................... 2 
1.3. Game Theory for Non-cooperative Groups .............................................................. 6 
1.4. Outline of the Dissertation ........................................................................................ 9 
Chapter 2. The Value of Cooperative Group Decision Making ........................................ 1 
2.1. Developing the Group Value Hierarchy .................................................................... 5 
2.2. Defining the utility function ....................................................................................... 7 
2.3. Creating the single-dimensional utility functions ....................................................... 9 
2.4. Determination of Alternatives ................................................................................. 10 
2.5. Scoring the value for each objective across alternatives ........................................ 12 
2.6. Conducting utility gap assessment ......................................................................... 13 
2.7. The Implementation ................................................................................................ 17 
2.8. Outcomes ............................................................................................................... 19 
2.9. Stakeholder Reactions ........................................................................................... 22 
2.10. Program Conclusion ............................................................................................. 23 
2.11. Contributions from this Practical Approach .......................................................... 24 
Chapter 3. The Cost of Non-Cooperative Group Decision Making .................................. 1 
 v 
 
3.1. A Formal Framework for Group Decisions in Cooperative and Non-Cooperative 
Situations ........................................................................................................................ 3 
3.2. Optimal Strategies in Collaborative and Non-Collaborative Group Decisions .......... 7 
3.3. An Example of Two Diners ....................................................................................... 9 
3.4. Non-Cooperative Decision-Making ......................................................................... 14 
3.5. Summary of Findings and Implications ................................................................... 27 
3.6. Increasing Objectives ............................................................................................. 31 
3.7. Contributions from the “Cost of Conflict” ................................................................ 32 
Chapter 4. Social Network and Group Decisions ............................................................ 1 
4.1. Social Network Theory Background ......................................................................... 3 
4.2. Social Networks and Influence in Strategic Group Decisions ................................... 4 
4.3. Deriving Extrinsic Weights ........................................................................................ 6 
4.3.1. Hub and Spoke ...................................................................................................... 6 
4.3.2. Chain ................................................................................................................... 10 
4.4. Interpretation of the results of stakeholder network examination: .......................... 12 
4.5. Characterizing the influence of stakeholders .......................................................... 13 
4.6. Returning to the Motivating Example ...................................................................... 19 
4.7. Contributions from Stakeholder Network Analysis.................................................. 24 
Chapter 5. Conclusions ................................................................................................. 27 
References. ................................................................................................................... 32 
 vi 
 
Table of Figures 
 
Figure 1. The Value Hierarchies of the Six Stakeholder Groups. .................................... 6 
Figure 2. Top Two Levels of the Group Value Hierarchy................................................. 7 
Figure 3. Examples of value and utility curves. ............................................................. 10 
Figure 4. The utility of each alternative decomposed by stakeholder (upper) and 
objective (lower). ........................................................................................................... 14 
Figure 5. Utility gaps for each alternative by objective and each stakeholder. .............. 16 
Figure 6. Utility comparison: three original alternatives and the new pilot and roll 
alternative. ..................................................................................................................... 18 
Figure 7. Example of normal form game representing the outcomes of the possible 
choices by each decision-maker under the i-th objective. ............................................... 5 
Figure 8. The normal form game considering each decision-makers two objective utility 
function. ........................................................................................................................... 6 
Figure 9. Example of Normal Form Game representing plays on two attributes 
(“Matching Pennies” and “Disharmony”). ......................................................................... 8 
Figure 10. The seven traditional games and the two nontraditional but related games 
that were used to explore Non-Cooperative decision-making behavior........................... 9 
Figure 11. Example of Normal Form Game representing two objectives about going to 
dinner. ........................................................................................................................... 10 
Figure 12. Two Examples of Normal Form Games representing the combined objectives 
about going to dinner..................................................................................................... 11 
 vii 
 
Figure 13. Regions of Group Utility Lost in Non-Cooperative Decision-Making for two 
diners going to dinner. ................................................................................................... 13 
Figure 14. Example of two objectives modeled as “Matching Pennies” and 
“Coordination”. .............................................................................................................. 15 
Figure 15. Regions of Group Utility Lost in Non-Cooperative Decision-Making for 
“Matching Pennies” versus “Coordination”. ................................................................... 16 
Figure 16. Regions of Pure Strategy Equilibria for “Matching Pennies” versus 
“Coordination”. .............................................................................................................. 16 
Figure 17. Example of two objectives modeled as “Battle of the Sexes” and 
“Coordination”. .............................................................................................................. 18 
Figure 18. Regions of Group Utility Lost in Non-Cooperative Decision-Making for “Battle 
of the Sexes” and “Coordination”. ................................................................................. 19 
Figure 19. Regions of Pure Strategy Equilibria for “Battle of the Sexes” and 
“Coordination”. .............................................................................................................. 19 
Figure 20. Example of two objectives modeled as “Coordination” and “Anti-
Coordination”. ................................................................................................................ 21 
Figure 21. Regions of Group Utility Lost in Non-Cooperative Decision-Making for 
“Coordination” and “Anti-Coordination”. ......................................................................... 22 
Figure 22. Regions of Pure Strategy Equilibria for “Coordination” and “Anti-
Coordination”. ................................................................................................................ 22 
Figure 23. Example of two objectives modeled as “Coordination” and “Hawk-Dove”. ... 23 
Figure 24. Regions of Group Utility Lost in Non-Cooperative Decision-Making for 
“Coordination” and “Hawk-Dove”. .................................................................................. 24 
 viii 
 
Figure 25. Regions of Pure Strategy Equilibria for “Coordination” and “Hawk-Dove”. ... 25 
Figure 26. Example of two objectives modeled as “Deadlock” and “Hawk-Dove”. ........ 26 
Figure 27. Regions of Group Utility Lost in Non-Cooperative Decision-Making for 
“Deadlock” and “Hawk-Dove”. ....................................................................................... 26 
Figure 28. Regions of Pure Strategy Equilibria for “Deadlock” and “Hawk-Dove”. ........ 27 
Figure 29. The Cost of Conflict with 2 to 5 objectives.................................................... 32 
Figure 30. The network structure for the Hub and Spoke configuration. ......................... 7 
Figure 31. The network structure for the Chain configuration. ....................................... 10 
Figure 32. A five-node network structure. ...................................................................... 15 
Figure 33. The network configuration of the six stakeholders from the bank example. . 19 
Figure 34. A Comparison of the Intrinsic and Extrinsic Weights of Each Stakeholder. .. 23 
 
 
  
 ix 
 
Table of Tables  
 
Table 1. The Alternatives Considered. .......................................................................... 12 
Table 2. Results of the Pairings of Games Indicating if the entire region (or part) has a 
difference between the Nash equilibrium and the optimal group utility. ......................... 28 
Table 3. Betweenness Centrality of Five Node Example. .............................................. 14 
Table 4. Strength Centrality of the Five Node Example................................................. 16 
Table 5. Strength Centrality for Hub and Spoke. ........................................................... 17 
Table 6. Strength Centrality for Chain. .......................................................................... 18 
Table 7. The weights elicited from the corporate stakeholders. .................................... 21 
Table 8. The extrinsic weights for the corporate stakeholders from the network model. 21 
Table 9. The Strength Centrality of the real example of the bank implementation. ....... 25 
 
 
  
 x 
 
Abstract 
GROUP DECISION MAKING 
By Edward Lewis Cook, Ph.D. 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
Director: Jason R. W. Merrick, Professor, Department of Supply Chain Management & 
Analytics 
The present work explores improvements in group decision-making.  It begins 
with a practical example using state-of-the-art techniques for a complex, high-risk 
decision.  We show how these techniques can reveal a better alternative.  Although we 
created an improved decision process, decision-makers were apt to protect their own 
organizations instead of the project.  This tendency was reduced over the course of the 
decision-making process but inspired the first conceptual component of this work. 
The first concept describes the “Cost of Conflict” that can arise in a group 
decision, using game theory to represent the non-cooperative approach and comparing 
the outcome to the cooperative approach.  We demonstrate that it is possible for the 
group to settle on a non-Paretto Nash equilibrium. The sensitivity of the decision-maker 
weights is revealed which led to the second conceptual portion of this work.   
The second concept applies social network theory to study the influence between 
decision-makers in a group decision.  By examining the number and strength of 
connections between decision-makers, we build from intrinsically derived weights to 
 xi 
 
extrinsically derived weights by adding the network influences from other decision-
makers. The two conceptual approaches provide a descriptive view of non-cooperative 
decisions where decision-makers still influence each other.  These concepts suggest a 
prescriptive approach to achieving a higher group utility. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Our aim in this work is to improve group decision-making, examining cooperative and 
non-cooperative group decisions in three studies. First, we implemented state-of-the-art 
methods in group decision theory and multi-attribute utility theory for high-value decision 
at a Fortune 100 company to demonstrate the value of a cooperative group decision 
amongst the executives. Second, we study the potential loss when the cooperative 
group approach is not used, which we call the “Cost of Conflict”. Finally, we study the 
influence individual stakeholders can have on a cooperative group decision using social 
network theory.    
1.1. Individual and Group Decisions 
In the last one hundred years, the understanding of decision-making has 
advanced across a number of fields.  With structural underpinnings from philosophy and 
mathematics, decision analysis has been further enhanced by the understanding of 
human cognition from psychology and economics.  The flow of decision theory’s 
development began with the individual decision-maker and was described by Keynes 
(1921), Ramsey (1926), and de Finetti (1937, 1949) by modeling a rational, sequential 
process.  In this initial work, the process was wholly owned by the individual decision-
maker but even at this early stage, notions of game theory began to come through as 
seen in de Finetti’s work (de Finetti 1949) in which a game context is considered.  It is 
not just the single decision-maker who can have influence on the final outcome of a 
decision process.   The decision-maker plays a role in the “market” of the decision as 
one would in a financial market.  This idea of a market introduces the decisions of 
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others as important or at least of impact to the decision process of the individual 
decision-maker.  The inauguration of game theory came with the landmark work of von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) who for the first time fully described a coherent 
approach to games that was both mathematically rigorous and predictive.    
Although game theory would later become important to understanding the group 
decision process and how individuals could come together to make a group decision, in 
these earlier stages of development, decision analysis remained largely focused on the 
decision process of the individual decision-maker.  The work built from single objective 
decisions and then moved on to advance into work on multi-objective decisions.  
Significant work still remains to be done in the understanding of group decision-making.  
Moreover, the approach of expanding from the understanding of the individual decision-
maker to describe the group decision may not be sufficient to create both a description 
of how decisions are made and a direction on how the could be improved.  Game theory 
may provide that needed tool.   
1.2. Decision Analysis for Group Decisions 
Broadly group decision can be thought of as any decision where a group of two 
or more individuals must jointly decide from a set of outcomes which impact all of the 
individuals in the group.  For focus, this work will not include three classes of group 
decision-making as described by Keeney (2013).  “One class is negotiations, because 
the individual negotiators are trying to best satisfy their own objectives rather than the 
group’s objectives, and each individual has veto power. A second class of decisions 
ruled out is voting situations where all votes are tabulated to select an alternative 
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according to a pre-specified rule, such as the candidate with the most votes wins.  In 
this case, there is a collection of individual decisions by the voters that leads, with no 
specific group action, to a selected alternative. The third class of decisions is social 
planning or social welfare decisions where an individual planner or organization, after 
taking judgments and preferences of individuals affected by the decision into account, 
makes the decision.” 
Early attempts to develop group decision-making theory began with the individual 
utility constructs and then expanding from there by aggregating those utilities through 
some function, but problems arose.  Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (Arrow 1951) was 
one of the first to show that the aggregation was likely to result in the group utility 
matching that of only one decision-maker.  The solution to the problems of extending 
individual decision-making to group decision-making has been approached in several 
different ways.  First, Raiffa (1968) posited the application of a group utility function and 
also a group probability distribution which can then be used to calculate a group 
expected utility for every alternative in the decision hierarchy.  Others extended this 
approach through a Bayesian view (Seidenfeld 1989, Mongin 1995, 1998, Gilboa 2004).  
All of these suffered from the underlying issue of the applicability of applying a Bayesian 
approach to a group.  The second approach which Keeney and Raiffa (1976) described 
was to develop a group utility function directly.  Aumann (1976) and Clemen & Winkler 
(1999) and O’Hagan (2006) worked to understand approaches to obtain group 
probabilities for each event so that the expected utility could be derived from there. 
All of these approaches have issues.  Mongin (1995) concluded that the only 
consistent aggregation would be through a dictator who would aggregate according to 
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one individual (likely the dictator) of the group thus making the group’s aggregations 
those of the individual.   Arrow (1951) began this process of seeing the limits of 
aggregations approaches with his impossibility theorem which showed that fairness to 
each individual would be lost as their preferences are brought together with any kind of 
ranking function.  This approach of aggregating individual decision has stymied many in 
their attempts to bring it to coherence and match experimental results. 
Keeney & Nau (2011) describe a two-stage process to overcome these issues.  
First, the group members develop a common understanding of the decision problem 
and then each evaluates the alternates from their individual perspective.  Second, the 
group collectively evaluates the alternatives using the individual evaluations as inputs.  
They start with the axioms of expected utility applied to acts whose outcomes depend 
on previous events (the individual perspective) and add a State-Independence axiom 
which separates subjective probabilities for events from the utility of the outcomes.   The 
probabilities are independent of the state space of outcomes.  With these axioms, 
Keeney & Nau (2011) declare:  “If the group preferences also satisfy an independence 
condition stating that only the marginal distributions of the members’ utilities are 
relevant and that any one member has sovereignty over group choices that affect only 
herself, then it follows that the group effectively has state-dependent expected utility 
preferences over the original set of acts, which are represented by a weighted sum of 
the state-independent expected-utility functions of the individual members. The values 
of the weights depend on both the members’ relative strengths of preference among the 
alternatives and the relative importance of the members in the group. If the group 
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members are in agreement on these parameters, then appropriate values for the 
weights can, in principle, be determined by separate consideration of these issues.” 
Keeney (2013) steps away from much of the problems of extending individual 
decisions to group decisions by removing the implicit assumption that each of the group 
members hold the same frame for their decision problem as the other decision-makers.  
This means that each decision-maker is concerned with the same consequences and 
each considers all of the events to matter.  To broaden the applicability of the approach 
Keeney (2013) assigns different probabilities to specific events for each decision-maker 
and different utilities to specific consequences for each decision-maker.  Finally, each 
decision-maker can have a different view on the impact of the consequences.  This 
construction makes the previous Keeney & Nau (2011) formulation a special case.  With 
the decision frame broadened, Keeney (2013) outlines both a procedure and a 
formulation for how the decision will be made.  The procedure has the individuals create 
their own view of the decision including their individual weighting of outcomes which 
allows for zero weighting if the outcome is of no consequence to the individual.  The 
individual values are then brought together in a weighting function that must be 
determined through some process such as equal weighting or percentage ownership, or 
seniority, or some other formulation.  Keeney solves the original issue of Arrow’s 
Impossibility Theorem and develops his analysis from a broad set of axioms, but he 
leaves behind the work to create a rigorous approach to balancing the weighting of each 
individual’s impact to the overall group decision. 
The multitude of previous attempts from Raiffa (1968), Hylland & Zeckhauser 
(1981), Seidenfeld et al. (1989), and Mongin (1995) to describe a generalized approach 
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to a group decision have all resulted in an impossibility theorem.  This makes Keeney 
(2013) an important step forward.  Nevertheless, the issue of ability to implement 
remains.  This solution is that the group expected utility for an alternative is the 
weighted sum of the individual member’s expected utilities for that alternative.  The 
approach solves problems such as maintaining the integrity of the individual decision 
analysis and is explicit in how the answers of the individuals should be combined into a 
group answer; however, a significant issue remains.  How is the group to decide what 
the appropriate weighting is across the individuals?  This is discussed in section 4.  
Additionally, what happens if the group is not acting fully cooperatively with the aim of 
maximizing the group utility?  Perhaps they may harbor some intent to maximize their 
own utility at the expense of the group, even if not explicitly.  One possible solution is to 
expand the analysis frame further and not “decide” but rather “discover” how the 
decision-makers are interacting.   
1.3. Game Theory for Non-cooperative Groups 
In their seminal work, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944) 
described the first fully coherent approach to game theory.  Their aim was to understand 
the mechanism of games and to make the connection back to economics as a way to 
explore other theoretical mechanisms for observed outcomes.    They were looking to 
establish not an analogy between games and economic behavior but a true and direct 
relationship.  They declared “that the typical problems of economic behavior become 
strictly identical with the mathematical notions of suitable games of strategy.”  von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944 p.4).  With this declaration, a new field of study was 
born, but not just for economic understanding.  Game theory would grow to impact 
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many fields of study including decision analysis, but first, more development was 
needed.  In the first chapter, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) describe game 
theory’s purpose as a tool to understand stable institutional arrangements or “standards 
of behavior” for any given situation or game.  The theory tries to predict what stable 
institutional form will emerge from any given game.  The theory does not posit an a 
priori arrangement, but rather expects one to emerge out of the game play itself.  It is 
the preferences and tastes of the players working within the rules of the game that 
produces the form.  In this way, game theory, as described by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944), departs from classical economic theory which describes the form 
first and then describes the outcomes. 
H.W. Kuhn (1950, 1953) described extensive form games which allow the 
designer of the game mechanism to specify how the game would play out and in what 
order the participants would play.  This understanding persists today with extensive 
form games becoming an entire class of study within game theory.  At the same time 
new insights were also developing.  The extensive form includes an element of time in 
contrast to the strategic form of a game which describes the actions and strategies of 
the players but not the play-by-play of the game itself.  A third description, providing 
even less information, is the characteristic form of a game which describes the set of 
payoffs to players no matter what the remaining players of the game do. 
Additionally, games can be described as cooperative or non-cooperative.  In four 
papers between 1950 and 1953 John Nash made formative contributions to both non-
cooperative game theory and to bargaining theory.  In two papers, “Equilibrium Points in 
N- Person Games” (1950) and “Non-Cooperative Games” (1951), Nash proved the 
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existence of a strategic equilibrium for non-cooperative games, now called the Nash 
equilibrium.  Nash also described "Nash program", which defines an approach to 
understanding cooperative games by breaking them down to their non-cooperative 
component parts.  In another tract of thought, Nash outlined his bargaining theory.  With 
both of these papers, he created an axiomatic bargaining theory.  With it, he proved 
both the existence of the Nash bargaining solution and he executed the first application 
of the Nash program.   
Cooperative games were further advanced with the work of Aumann (1961, 
1964) who showed how cooperative games could be played such that an improvement 
of the Nash Equilibrium was possible through trading of information about strategies by 
the players.  In the 1970’s, work also advanced on the ability of groups to make 
decisions impacting themselves.  This research first appeared when Groves (1973) 
explored what happens to teams when the individuals within the team have different 
interests and utility curves.  With divergent interests the team’s action can degenerate 
into an (N+1)-person game where a manager must be called in to take the input of the 
team and convert that input into a more complete frame, so that the manager can find 
the best equilibrium point for the group.  Effectively, the team is not deciding the 
outcome.  Groves and Loeb (1975) solve this problem by creating a mechanism by 
which a central actor or agent draws out the information from the team and presents it 
back to them in a feedback loop that allows the team to determine the dominant 
strategy that reveals the best equilibrium point. 
Even with this advance the prevailing attitude toward game theory as a tool to 
help with group decision-making (as a cooperative approach) revealed skepticism that 
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broader applications were possible.  Rasmussen (1989) typified this skepticism of 
applying cooperative gave theory in this articulation “Cooperative game theory may be 
useful for ethical decisions but its attractive features are inappropriate for most 
economic situations, and the spirit of axiomatic approach is very different from the utility 
maximization of current economic theory.”  While decision analysis was moving from 
utility theory and into predictive analysis of decisions mainly studied and researched by 
those in operations research, game theory largely remained the purview of economists 
and was used in relatively narrow sets of research.  The employment of von Neumann 
and Morgenstern’s (1944) work as a tool for decision analysis was still yet to be 
realized. 
1.4. Outline of the Dissertation 
We describe a practical implementation of group decision theory for a multi-
million-dollar technology and process change at a nearly 1000-branch bank in Chapter 
2.  We showed that the latest methods in group decision theory could be used in 
practice by embedding them in the program management processes of the bank.  One 
of the consistent issues throughout this implementation was the tendency for the 
decision-makers to protect their own organizations within the bank at the expense of the 
overall project, a tendency that was reduced over the course of the decision-making 
process. 
Given the tendency of decision-makers to veer away from a fully cooperative 
approach, we developed the first of two conceptual portions of this work.  Chapter 3 
describes the “Cost of Conflict” that can arise in a group decision, using game theory to 
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represent the non-cooperative approach and comparing the outcome to the cooperative 
group solution.   
The second conceptual portion of this work, as described in Chapter 4, we use 
social network theory as a lens to study the influence that decision-makers can have on 
each other in a group decision, through the number and strength of connections 
between decision makers. 
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Chapter 2. The Value of Cooperative Group Decision Making 
Decision-making in a large corporation often requires the engagement of many 
stakeholders.  This makes it difficult to establish the criteria to evaluate strategies and to 
determine who will approve the final decision.  This multiple stakeholder decision 
difficulty can be brought about by a number of dynamics.  Sometimes it is driven by a 
desire to achieve acceptance by the stakeholders in the hopes that the change will land 
better with the entire organization.  Sometimes it is the reliance on an organizational 
matrix structure that operates with the engagement of multiple stakeholders.  
Sometimes the complexity of the issues means no one decision-maker is able to 
understand, analyze, and choose an approach. Capital One was facing just such a 
decision.  The following is a description of that decision and the practical 
implementation of the framework that Keeney (2013) describes as a method to execute 
against a multi-objective, multi-stakeholder decision. 
The company had embarked on an effort to rollout a new Bank Teller system for 
its nearly 1000-branch network.  In addition, a new technology called Branch Image 
Capture (BIC) would also rollout that would take an image of a check and read the 
handwritten and encoded information.  This imaging capability would ensure the 
digitization of all elements of the check instead of the teller hand-keying information into 
the teller system, as is done in most bank branches.  The implications of the change 
were profound.  Information about the customers’ transactions would be rapidly 
transmitted to all bank systems.  Customers could view the information for their 
transaction immediately, instead of having to wait for it to be physically transported to an 
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operations center for overnight processing.  Also, the transactions would be “perfected” 
while the customer was at the teller line, meaning any issues with the transaction (e.g. 
mutilated checks, deposit slip errors, etc.) would be fixed immediately.  This prevented 
the need to send “adjustment” letters to the customer explaining that a change had 
been made to their account.  These letters could be a confusing experience for the 
customer often prompting them to contact the bank’s call center to seek clarification. 
For Capital One’s cost structure, the impact was also dramatic.  Millions of 
dollars would be eliminated since checks and other transaction documents would not be 
transported to operations centers for processing and fraudulent checks could be spotted 
rapidly since the information was transmitted immediately.  Beyond transportation cost 
savings, there were additional savings for the operations group from reductions in 
transaction exceptions and the operator time necessary to resolve them.  The 
implementation also had impacts for the Branch team.  The increased functionality 
allowed tellers to improve conversations with customers and focus on their needs, 
leading to additional new accounts for all products and services across the Bank.  For 
the technology group, this implementation meant a reduction in antiquated systems that 
were expensive to maintain and difficult to upgrade.  Overall, this new technology led to 
cost reductions and improved associate engagement and customer satisfaction. 
To get the full value of the effort, however, a very significant information 
technology upgrade was required.  At its heart, three main areas needed improvement: 
1. The Teller System plus the adjoining Branch Image Capture (BIC) capability 
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2. A new middleware to provide the connection to the mainframe that held the 
customer information 
3. A back office (centralized for all branches) processing platform to ensure the 
checks were sent to other banks and the Federal Reserve to receive the 
funds 
The second and third efforts were largely information system upgrades that had 
smaller impacts on associates and could be implemented in weekend conversions.  
This weekend implementation provided the opportunity to undo the change should a 
problem occur.  In stark contrast, the first effort would take months to convert each 
branch and troubleshoot and repair problems. This was not only paramount for 
maintaining a good experience for customers but was also a regulatory requirement for 
the bank.  A poor rollout could have meaningful negative impacts on the bank. 
Often in a business context, the financially based business case drives the 
decision-maker by constraining the types of attributes that can be used to make a 
decision, and then forcing them to be monetized so that a discounted cash flow model 
(often Net-Present Value) can be employed.  This is an approach mandated by most 
corporate finance departments in an attempt to drive a common view of large programs, 
especially those with significant infrastructure costs.  Although a valuable tool for 
deciding if a project would positively impact a business, this methodology does not 
cover two major concerns for a successful infrastructure implementation. 
Risks: Unless they are monetized, a discounted cash-flow model does not 
handle the review of risks.  It, therefore, does not help the decision-maker to deal with 
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these risks within the core decision framework.  Instead, the decision-maker is forced to 
glom on some sort of risk factor to the discounted cash flow model. 
Change Management:  Since the implementation of a teller system is essentially 
a process of putting new tools into the hands of tellers so that they can serve 
customers, understanding how those tellers will adapt to the change and implement the 
new tools is key to making a good decision as to how to do the rollout of a large 
infrastructure project.  Here again a discounted cash flow model is blind to this 
consideration unless the impacts are monetized. 
The change would affect multiple stakeholders across the organization. The goal 
was to apply some of the leading ideas in decision analysis and then implement them in 
a practical setting.  Additionally, we wished to apply stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984) 
from the strategic management literature to include all affected parties across the 
organization in the decision-making process. We elicited objectives following the 
findings of Bond et al. (2008, 2010) and developed multi-attribute utility functions for 
each stakeholder group. To understand utility dependence, we used utility trees to 
develop a utility function for some stakeholders (Abbas 2011). Finally, we used the 
group decision-making approach in Keeney (2013) to develop a group utility function 
increasing traceability and buy-in from the stakeholders. This also allowed the extension 
of previous applications of objective value-gap analysis (Merrick et al. 2005, Feng and 
Keller 2006) to stakeholder value-gap analysis and the development of new, superior 
alternatives. A multi-objective, multi-stakeholder approach to decision-making pushes 
the underlying theory towards greater complexity but is reflective of the complexity 
found in typical large corporate decisions.   
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Interestingly, Freeman (1980), the originator of Stakeholder Theory, implemented 
a form of multi-objective, multi-stakeholder decision analysis.  In this application, 
Freeman has taken the first step to drive toward a truly inclusive approach to finalizing a 
decision, but this formulation has each stakeholder creating their own view of the multi-
objective decision and then seeking a negotiated final group decision.  This would 
ultimately run into Arrow’s Paradox. 
2.1. Developing the Group Value Hierarchy 
We created the Group Value Hierarchy assigning each of the six executive 
stakeholder hierarchies to a different branch of the hierarchy.  By creating a clear view 
of the hierarchy of objectives, the decision-makers were better able to understand the 
characteristics of the objectives and how they related to their underlying concerns.  
Following Keeney (1992), we constructed the objectives hierarchy by holding facilitated 
discussions during weekly meetings of the executives.  Figure 2 shows the first two 
levels of that group hierarchy while Figure 1 shows the individual stakeholder 
hierarchy’s that underlie the group hierarchy. 
Although these sessions included regular updates of progress as the component 
elements of the technology systems were under development and testing, a goodly 
portion of the time was devoted to group discussion.  In these sessions, objectives were 
brainstormed and then scrutinized by examining problems and potential shortcomings 
under each objective.   
 
 
Edward Cook Draft Dissertation April 2019 
 
 
6 
 
Branch Value Hierarchy Fraud Value Hierarchy 
 
 
Operations Value Hierarchy Compliance Value Hierarchy 
 
 
 
IT Value Hierarchy 
 
Risk Value Hierarchy 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Value Hierarchies of the Six Stakeholder Groups. 
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discuss the consequences of failure and success for each objective.  Although this did 
not move to a discussion where the specifics of the value were ascribed, it did help all 
executives see the meaning of each objective to each executive.  They came closer to a 
shared understanding of what each objective meant in a qualitative sense. 
 
Figure 2. Top Two Levels of the Group Value Hierarchy. 
2.2. Defining the utility function 
The literature has several implementations using the notion of an additive value 
function as an appropriate model for the impact that the various objectives would have 
on the overall outcome.  As a landmark, Kirkwood’s (1997) interpretation of Dyer and 
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Sarin (1979) approach assumes mutual preferential independence amongst the 
attributes.  This approach was used by Merrick et al. (2005), Feng and Keller (2006), 
Ewing et al. (2006) and is fairly standard across the literature.  The additive value 
function can be written as  
 𝑣(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛) =  ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑣𝑖(𝑥𝑖),         𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1    (1) 
and where 𝑣(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛) is the overall value for the alternative, xi, and wi is the 
weight assigned to the i-th objective by the decision-makers, and 𝑣𝑖(𝑥𝑖) is the single 
attribute value function for that i-th objective.    
Since this decision on the approach for program rollout would be made by 
multiple executive stakeholders, we used the group utility function from Keeney (2013).  
This approach sets up the possibility to elicit the utility curve for each stakeholder 
against the objectives that matter to them individually.  Weights are then applied to each 
executive stakeholder’s individual utility function to form the group utility, specifically 
𝑈𝐺(𝐴𝑘) =  ∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑈𝑚(𝐴𝑘) =  ∑ 𝑤𝑚(∑ 𝑝𝑚(𝐸𝑚𝑗)𝑢𝑚(𝑐𝑘𝑚𝑗
1 , 𝑐𝑘𝑚𝑗
2 , … , 𝑐𝑘𝑚𝑗
𝑛𝑚 ))
𝑚𝑛
𝑒=1
𝑛
𝑚=1    
𝑛
𝑚=1 (2) 
where 𝑈𝑚(𝐴𝑘) is the expected utility of member 𝑚 for alternate 𝐴𝑘; 𝑝𝑚(𝐸𝑚𝑗) is the 
subjective probability of member 𝑚 for event 𝐸𝑚𝑗, and 𝑢𝑚(𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑒
𝑜𝑚 ) is the utility for member 
𝑚 over consequence, 𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑒
𝑜𝑚 , where 𝑚 = 1,… , 𝑛, 𝑒 = 1,… ,𝑚𝑛, 𝑎 = 1,… , 𝑘, and 
∑ 𝑤𝑚 = 1
𝑛
𝑚=1 . 
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With the guidance of the executive stakeholders, we developed the functional 
forms for each of the six executive stakeholders, Operations ( OU ), Branch ( BU  ), Fraud 
( FU  ), Compliance ( CU  ), and Risk ( RU ): 
𝑈𝑂(𝑎, 𝑐, 𝑡) = [𝑈𝑂(𝑎
0, 𝑐∗, 𝑡∗) − 𝑈𝑂(𝑎
0, 𝑐∗, 𝑡0) − 𝑈𝑂(𝑎
0, 𝑐0, 𝑡∗)]𝑈𝑂(𝑐)𝑈𝑂(𝑡)
+ 𝑈𝑂(𝑎
0, 𝑐∗, 𝑡0)𝑈𝑂(𝑐) + 𝑈𝑂(𝑎
0, 𝑐0, 𝑡∗)𝑈𝑂(𝑡) + 𝑈𝑂(𝑎
∗, 𝑐0, 𝑡0)𝑈𝑂(𝑎) 
𝑈𝐵(𝑎, 𝑐, 𝑡, 𝑏) = [𝑈𝐵(𝑎
0, 𝑐∗, 𝑡∗, 𝑏0) − 𝑈𝐵(𝑎
0, 𝑐∗, 𝑡0, 𝑏0) − 𝑈𝐵(𝑎
0, 𝑐0, 𝑡∗, 𝑏0)]𝑈𝐵(𝑐)𝑈𝐵(𝑡)
+ 𝑈𝐵(𝑎
0, 𝑐∗, 𝑡0, 𝑏0)𝑈𝐵(𝑐) + 𝑈𝐵(𝑎
0, 𝑐0, 𝑡∗, 𝑏0)𝑈𝐵(𝑡) + 𝑈𝐵(𝑎
∗, 𝑐0, 𝑡0, 𝑏0)𝑈𝐵(𝑎)
+ 𝑈𝐵(𝑎
0, 𝑐0, 𝑡0, 𝑏∗)𝑈𝐵(𝑏) 
𝑈𝐹(𝑣) = 𝑈𝐹(𝑣) 
𝑈𝐶(𝑏, 𝑣) = 𝑈𝐶(𝑏
∗, 𝑣0)𝑈𝐶(𝑏) + 𝑈𝐶(𝑏
0, 𝑣∗)𝑈𝐶(𝑣) 
𝑈𝑅(𝑏, 𝑣) = 𝑈𝑅(𝑏
∗, 𝑣0)𝑈𝑅(𝑏) + 𝑈𝑅(𝑏
0, 𝑣∗)𝑈𝑅(𝑣) 
2.3. Creating the single-dimensional utility functions 
Utility functions were determined for each objective using mid-value splitting 
technique (Keeney and Raiffa 1976) for deterministic attributes and the certainty 
equivalent technique (Clemen and Reilly 2001) for uncertain attributes.  This evaluation 
was done by proxy with the author determining the appropriate value depending on the 
impact to the program and company.  This is an aggregation method of sorts, whereby 
we are driving a collective view of the value on behalf of the executive stakeholders.  
This layer of abstraction deviates from Keeney (2013) in that utility curves were not 
determined for each objective completely by each stakeholder.  Instead, we used a 
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simplifying assumption that the single utility curve was sufficient because the spread in 
objectives across the various stakeholders was wide, so that not every objective was of 
importance to every stakeholder. 
Figure 3 shows the utility functions of “Additional Costs Beyond Budget” and the 
more straightforward value function of “Additional Time to Complete Project.”  The utility 
function was based on conversation with the executive stakeholders and was created 
as a singular representation of their individual utility functions.  This simplification was 
used in order to save the time of eliciting each individual utility function.  We justify this 
approach based on the close similarity of each executive stakeholder in their 
appreciation for the utility of the various objectives.   
 
 
Figure 3. Examples of value and utility curves. 
2.4. Determination of Alternatives 
With the basic structure of the objectives and utility functions in place for the 
rollout decision, we then developed the alternatives that would be tested against the 
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model.  This was an active process that included both one-on-one discussions with 
executives as well as group discussion in our regular weekly meetings.  The information 
gained from reference interviews with other banks that had executed similar efforts were 
included in the discussion, as well as the experience of others at Capital One that had 
seen these types of rollouts in other companies.  The experience level was significant 
and outcomes observed by these experts varied significantly.  This presented excellent 
context to examine the success and failure of previous rollouts.  It not only drove the list 
of alternatives, but also acted as a check that the objectives we had chosen were 
relevant.  Although there were many possibilities to rollout a teller system to a large 
branch network, the conversations with executive stakeholders settled into three 
categories.   
1. Big Bang: Over a weekend shift everyone to the new systems and processes 
2. Slow Roll: Each week rollout the changes to a small percentage of branches 
3. Regional Rollout: Move through each region successively 
Before engaging in detailed discussion, we performed a high-level review to 
ensure effective communication with stakeholders.  This was just a simple pros-and-
cons view, but relating it back to the objectives in the model, served to create a useful 
document for driving discussion. This process served as a primer for the executives to 
begin thinking about the broader impact of each alternative.  The success of the scoring 
effort, we are convinced, was improved by keeping the process inside a framework 
familiar to the executives. 
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Table 1. The Alternatives Considered. 
Alternatives Approach High-level Pros High-Level Cons 
Big-Bang Over weekend shift 
all branches and 
operations centers 
simultaneously 
 
Fastest 
completion 
Flexibility of date 
No room for error 
correction/learning 
Training time tight 
Slow Roll Each week roll out 
a small (<5%) 
percentage of 
branches  
More time to learn 
from mistakes 
Balances training 
load 
Cannot adjust systems 
or repair software 
issues without 
retraining 
 
Regional 
Rollout 
Roll out by each of 
the regions and 
advance to the next 
after issues 
resolved 
More controlled 
than Big Bang 
Could target 
troubled areas first 
to remove existing 
issues 
Issues specific to 
regions may not show 
till too late  
Cannot adjust systems 
or repair software 
issues without 
retraining 
 
2.5. Scoring the value for each objective across alternatives 
The determination of the values for the quantitative measures was relatively 
straightforward.  Analysis had already been performed on cost savings and 
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improvements.  High and low values had been determined and a “fairway” value 
determined as well.  This allowed a straightforward inclusion in the model.  The 
determination of the more qualitative objectives in the model again relied on a proxy 
approach.  We determined the “fairway” value of these qualitative elements based on 
the feedback and conversation with the executive stakeholders.  The final step was to 
add in the uncertainty inherent in some objectives to represent the full measure of 
variability.  Defining uncertainty was straightforward as the program had many 
experienced managers and subject matter experts that had worked on programs of 
similar complexity.  We determined the distributions based on the conversations with 
these experts and then added those into the model using Monte Carlo simulation. 
2.6. Conducting utility gap assessment  
Figure 4 shows the group utility for the three alternatives for program rollout, 
showing that the Big Bang alternative achieved the highest utility value. The stacked bar 
chart view in Figure 4 shows the additive components of the group utility function, 
allowing the decomposition of the group utility values by component objectives and by 
stakeholder groups. 
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Figure 4. The utility of each alternative decomposed by stakeholder (upper) and 
objective (lower). 
Following Merrick (2005) we conducted a utility gap assessment.  This is a 
process of assessing the possible maximum utility for an objective versus the actual 
utility for the objective under a given alternative.  This provides a comparison for the 
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various alternatives, as well as indicating where each alternative fell short. A breakdown 
of the three alternatives into the five primary component objectives showed the specifics 
as to where the value was most lacking and where it was closer to realizing the full 
possible value. This was a typical gap analysis performed in Merrick (2005) and Feng 
and Keller (2006). However, the form of the group utility function also allowed us to 
perform utility gap analysis for each stakeholder’s contribution to the group utility 
function. Figure 5 shows the three alternatives decomposed by objective and 
decomposed by stakeholder.  
In this breakdown, it was clear the Big Bang was the superior alternative in all 
objectives except for “Brand.”  The riskier nature of a rollout occurring all at once with so 
much new functionality increased the effects of errors which would negatively impact 
the brand.  This highlighted for the executive stakeholders the importance of “Brand” as 
one of the measures and led to the search of a fourth alternative that might combine the 
best of the first three alternatives and increase the overall score. 
Through this analysis the stakeholders recognized that the initial set of 
alternatives was not sufficient.  This was an important insight that came from this 
process of looking at rollout alternatives.  Seeing that the three alternatives did not 
handle the concerns of all the executive stakeholders well enough, the search for a 
fourth better alternative was more clearly needed. 
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Figure 5. Utility gaps for each alternative by objective and each stakeholder. 
With much of the uncertainty coming from the speed of the rollout it became clear 
that a slower, more careful rollout at the beginning was warranted, but a problem 
remained:  translating a complex analytical model into a useful conversation with time-
constrained executive stakeholders. The key to driving a useful conversation was a 
review of previous similar programs at Capital One and their outcomes across the five 
main objectives for this program.  A lesson’s learned style review is common, so this 
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presented a comfortable approach to understanding how to proceed, but delivered in a 
different framework, namely the five main objectives and a means-to-ends style of 
analysis.  Although the model itself was not explicitly shared with the executives, it did 
prove to be an insightful tool as it drove the analysis team’s facilitation.  In this manner, 
the discussion was richer with more grounded analysis and led to comfort in the final 
decision, the Pilot then Rollout approach. 
The Pilot and Rollout alternative provided the best closing of the value gap.  In 
particular, the value to “Compliance” increased tremendously as the risk of failures in 
the processing of customer transactions was better managed through the normal “test-
and-learn” approach of a pilot.  In the previous three alternatives, there were tradeoffs 
made between high scores in “Associate” and “Brand,” but with this fourth alternative 
both of those objectives have high scores.  This makes the overall utility for Pilot and 
Rollout the highest of the four alternatives (see Figure 6). 
2.7. The Implementation  
Although the implementation approach was determined, the implementation itself 
was a complex process that required significant oversight.  There were several 
concerns.  First, not all branches were the same.  There were regional differences that 
needed to be accounted for in determining the pace of branch conversion to the new 
systems and processes.  We also implemented a process where a teller who had been 
through the rollout would go to a future branch to be with them during their rollout.  This 
provided useful expertise at each branch but required a significant scheduling and 
oversight effort to minimize travel distances. 
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Figure 6. Utility comparison: three original alternatives and the new pilot and roll 
alternative. 
Second, there were elements of technology and procedural changes for each 
rollout as the branch closed the old systems and converted to the new systems.  These 
two parallel processes were managed by two command centers, one focused on 
technology and the other on the branch associates.  Each of these command centers 
worked with their respective teams to ensure that issues were handled and appropriate 
schedules executed.  There were dozens of steps that needed to be completed in each 
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branch, some of which required a rollback to the old system if done improperly meaning 
the branch would have to be rescheduled for conversion.  A third, central command 
center was used to coordinate across the two command centers and then into the 
myriad of other support teams that are part of a large banking operation.  All three 
command centers had to work in close concert in order for the work to go smoothly and 
for quick issue resolution.  The Pilot and Rollout approach allowed these teams to learn 
during the pilot phases and then hone their techniques as the rollout proceeded over six 
months. 
The third concern was that all this work needed to stay invisible to the customer.  
As the branch opened on the following day there could be no issues in servicing 
customers.  As the team had learned through customer feedback sessions, their 
expectation was that the branch would simply work and be there to handle their needs. 
The Pilot and Rollout approach allowed the command center teams to learn where the 
points of concern would be and how to handle them should anything go wrong.  The 
impact was dramatic.  Customers loved the changes and would frequently comment to 
the tellers that the upgrades were greatly appreciated. 
2.8. Outcomes 
The value of the Pilot and Roll approach was evident soon after launch of the 
very first branch.  The initial pilot implementation was difficult.  The defect rate for some 
of the new software was unexpectedly high and the gut-wrenchingly difficult call was 
made to delay by a month.  Had the approach been to move forward with a quicker 
rollout as had been done successfully with other programs, the results would have been 
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disastrous.  In fact, in reference calls with three other banks they reported delays of six 
months, eight months, and for one bank a horrific delay of sixteen months.  To be so 
forthcoming with this information was an indication of the frustration those banks had in 
getting to the start of their implementation.  It also showed how complexity of 
implementation could readily turn into significant delays. 
Even with this delay, the single branch pilot allowed further surprises to be better 
managed.  As issues appeared, mitigation plans could be put in place for this single 
pilot that could not have been managed with a multi-branch roll out; the manual nature 
of the workarounds would have been too cumbersome and difficult to control.  With only 
one branch, it was also easier to experiment with different techniques.  Sometimes this 
resulted in a change to the software; sometimes this resulted in a change in procedure; 
sometimes changes, that seemed so necessary when the software requirements were 
elicited, were found to be unnecessary and the process and software was simplified for 
the future rollout.  The impact of this approach was significant.  From the reference 
calls, it was clear that other banks had struggled in implementing this very same 
software.  Had Capital One experienced even the more moderate six-month delay, the 
cost overrun would have been in excess of $9M just to maintain the program.  Even 
more time would have been spent to repair any damage done by the issues that caused 
the concern in the first place.  A delay of sixteen-months would have been nearly $24M 
and surely would have had other costs associated with issues that a poor rollout would 
have caused.   Instead, this decision process, and the new Pilot and Rollout alternative 
it revealed, avoided these costly delays as predicted in the model.  
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Over the next year the software development was completed in two phases and 
rolled out into the lone branch.  This iterative process allowed for more insights and 
more adjustments to be used for the ultimate rollout across the entire Capital One 
branch network. When the rollout to other branches began, there was still trepidation 
amongst the executives and the program team.  Now that multiple tellers would be 
using the system, multiple defects and issues were likely to surface.  To be sure, 
problems did arise but they proved easier to fix and control than in previous 
conversions.  Clearly, the reduction in risk was substantial as predicted by the strong 
scores of the pilot then rollout alternative for the Risk and Compliance stakeholders. 
These risks can broadly be placed in three categories: Regulatory risks, 
Operational risks, and Reputation risks.  Regulatory risks are straightforward to 
understand but have a low tolerance for error; as a result, Capital One was particularly 
keen to manage these risks tightly.  With a pilot approach it was possible to closely 
monitor the transactions moving through the system in real time.  This was critical to 
ensuring that all regulatory requirements were met.  If there was an issue, this level of 
monitoring allowed for quick reaction to fix the problem.  As a result, there were no 
regulatory issues with the pilot and rollout approach.  This level of monitoring would not 
have been possible and it was through the decision approach taken that this came to 
light.  Similarly, Operational risks were also easily monitored.  The team implemented a 
balanced score card that grew out of the decision model based on the notion that 
anything worth measuring to make a decision was likely worth measuring through the 
rollout.  This proved to be true as operational issues popped up and were again easily 
handled as the team monitored transactions as they began at the teller line all the way 
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through to transmittal outside Capital One and posting to the general ledger.  This level 
of scrutiny would not have been possible in the other approaches.   
Reputation risk turned out to be a surprise.  Given that the purpose of the 
processes and systems implemented was largely transactional, the expectation as that 
there would be no reputational upside and only risk to be managed.  This was not true.  
Because of the highly scrutinized manner in which the pilot was conducted, customers 
found the changes to be highly positive.   This was shown in the regular survey of 
customer satisfaction with their experience in the Branches.  The survey participants are 
selected via a random sample and queried within days of their visit to the branch.  In the 
immediate months after the rollout to a branch scores improves from 1 to 4 percentage 
points depending on the specific branch.  This is a large improvement especially given 
that many of these branches had maintained very strong scores for years.  Achieving a 
bump up in rating to that significance was a positive surprise.  In the comments, 
customers said that they saw the extra care that Capital One was putting into the rollout 
and felt good about that experience.  This had not been the result in previous rollouts.  
The team learned from this impact and pulled together a higher-touch rollout approach 
across all of the branches which centered on placing tellers, experienced in the new 
system, into branches that were going through the rollout.   
2.9. Stakeholder Reactions 
For the Executive Stakeholders, the results of this approach were astounding.  
Given the complex nature of the implementation and the amount of change introduced 
into the bank, there were expectations that significant problems would arise.  Several 
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expected there to be delays in the rollout schedule.  In fact, plans were made to handle 
as much as a six-month delay given experience with other programs of similar 
magnitude.  That delay did not happen.  Preparations were made to handle fallout that 
might come from significant issues in processing transactions.  That did not happen.  
Perhaps most surprisingly, executive stakeholders from across the bank were expecting 
there to be morale issues with associates as fatigue kicked in and issues with 
customers might arise.  Certainly, the delivery team began to tire under the weight of 
the work, but engagement scores, a measure of associate happiness at work, actually 
rose during this period.  These scores are measured by survey on a quarterly basis.  
During the time that the rollout was underway the scores moved up 3 percentage points.  
This was quite unexpected but because of its significance the approach the team took 
became a beacon for how such programs should be managed. 
For some groups like Compliance and Risk Management, this approach provided 
a complete reversal of their usual role.  Instead of being in the position of having to say 
“no” to requests, they became an integral part of the decision process.  Their needs 
were imbedded in the decision model.  In the very next effort at in the bank, those 
executives started the process asking for the same level of input.  In just a few short 
months, the positive results are already being repeated in another important effort for 
the bank.     
2.10. Program Conclusion 
The program became a beacon for well-disciplined and nuanced risk 
management and decision-making at Capital One.  The president of the bank declared 
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that the program was a model for how large change efforts should be managed.  The 
impact to the business was immediate and substantial.  Costs were reduced at each 
branch transitioned to the new system and processes.  Branch managers lauded the 
rollout process and how well-managed and controlled it was.  Amazingly customer 
satisfaction ticked up a couple of percentage points, an unprecedented increase for 
such a large change. 
Interestingly, the case for a Pilot and Rollout approach to large program 
implementation remained unobvious as other programs took different tacks.  This 
indicates that the Pilot and Rollout approach was not a universally appropriate 
technique that the team simply struggled to discover.  Instead, it was clear that each 
program is different and a separate decision process was warranted for each.  An 
analysis that captured both the quantitative elements and the softer ones was pivotal to 
the success of the effort. It was also evident that the explicit inclusion of stakeholders in 
the structured decision-making process was necessary and the conversations required 
to construct a multi-objective, multi-stakeholder utility model meant a better examination 
of the potential consequences and improved alignment of the stakeholders.  Although 
Capital One has created successful implementations of complex initiatives, these 
techniques provided an improvement to the processes already in place.  
2.11. Contributions from this Practical Approach 
During the early stages of the project, the executives were unwilling to discuss 
the importance of each objective to their business area in front of the group due to 
concerns that others would use this information against them. The decision-making 
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process we followed involved the executives in deeper discussions about objectives 
than previous projects at the company and the sharing of data and information to help 
build the probability distributions on each attribute. This process improved trust amongst 
the executives and led them to share the weights they would place on each objective. 
The executives quickly realized that the business areas placed very different 
emphasis on the objectives and would be affected very differently by the alternative 
implementations of this new technology. In most implementations of multi-attribute utility 
theory, weights on the objectives are elicited from each stakeholder and the average for 
each objective across the stakeholders is used in the final utility function. In the 
approach described in this chapter, we constructed a utility function for executive’s 
business area and then weighted the business areas to form the company’s group utility 
function. This allowed the executives to see how their peers would be impacted by each 
alternative as well as the overall impact on the company.  
The resulting utility gap analysis was eye-opening and led the executives to 
develop a new alternative that would not have such negative impacts on one or more 
business areas. This implementation reveals two critical observations that are often 
over-looked in discussions about decision theory. First, the process of constructing a 
decision analysis model can have significant positive benefits in building trust and 
understanding amongst the stakeholders. Second, the value of decision analysis is 
more than just selecting an alternative; the executives developed a better alternative 
that would not have been considered without this analysis and it led to a significant 
return on investment. 
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Chapter 3. The Cost of Non-Cooperative Group Decision Making 
When a group or committee must make a decision, the members of the group 
may not agree on the merits of each proposed alternative. They may measure success 
differently or they may have different beliefs about the probability of possible outcomes 
(Gilboa, Samet, & Schmeidler, 2004; Mongin, 1995, 1998; Seidenfeld, Kadane, & 
Schervish, 1989). Disagreements about probabilities are often caused by asymmetries 
in the information each group member has available (Clemen & Winkler, 1987; Winkler, 
1981), and can be reduced by sharing or aggregating this information (Brodbeck, 
Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt, 2007). Different measures of success can be 
caused by individuals assigning different utilities to given levels of a single consequence 
measure (Dyer & Sarin, 1979), different consequence measures (Keeney, 2013), or 
different weighting of multiple objectives (Baucells & Sarin, 2003). A frequent 
assumption of work in group decision-making is that the group is selecting a single 
alternative from a common set of alternatives. This is usually the case in a cooperative 
group decision. However, strategic decision-making can be more complex as it is a 
process comprised of many individual decisions (Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; 
Papadakis, Lioukas, & Chambers, 1998) with the hope that the overall strategy is 
aligned (Iaquinto & Fredrickson, 1997).  
In a review of the strategic decision-making literature, Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 
(1992) conclude “that organizations are accurately portrayed as political systems in 
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which strategic decision-makers have partially conflicting objectives.” It seems clear that 
the individual decision-maker plays an important role in the strategy process 
(Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006). Furthermore, several studies show that 
organizational outcomes are improved by dissent and structured conflict (De Dreu & 
West, 2001; Dooley & Fryxell, 1999; Dooley, Fryxell, & Judge, 2000; Priem, Harrison, & 
Muir, 1995) and including decision-makers with diverse experience (Horwitz & Horwitz, 
2007) and roles in the organization (Simons, Pelled, & Smith, 1999). However, political 
maneuverings and conflict between decision-maker groups can derail a strategic 
decision process (Cooper & Zmud, 1990), often caused by an asymmetry of values and 
objectives across the decision-makers (Kim & Kankanhalli, 2009; Leidner & Kayworth, 
2006; Levine & Rossmoore, 1993). 
This section extends the multiple-objective multi-stakeholder decision framework 
to allow for different sets of alternatives for each decision-maker and models the 
strategic interaction of these decisions using a game theoretic approach. Our framework 
assumes that the decision-makers have multiple, common objectives that are 
aggregated through their individual multi-attribute utility function. The outcomes for each 
decision-maker are affected by the choices of the other decision-makers and this effect 
can be different for each objective and each decision-maker can assign different 
weights to the objectives. The resulting utilities are a game in the sense of Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Nash (1951). A game theory construct allows us 
to study the equilibrium solutions when there is an asymmetry of values and objectives. 
We are not the first to study games with vector payoffs (Morgan, 2005; Zeleny, 1975; 
Zhao, 1991), but our focus is not the existence of an equilibrium. Instead, we study the 
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impact of Cooperative and Non-Cooperative approaches to group decision-making 
when individual decision-makers have their own alternative sets and there is an 
asymmetry of values and objectives.  
3.1. A Formal Framework for Group Decisions in Cooperative and Non-
Cooperative Situations 
Consider a set of decision-makers 𝑀, with |𝑀| ≥ 2. In the traditional group 
decision formulation, the set of alternatives 𝐴 is common for all decision-makers. Each 
decision-maker 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 can have their own set of mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive events that represent potential outcomes, denoted by 𝐸𝑚{𝐸𝑚,1, … , 𝐸𝑚,𝑂𝑚}, 
and their own consequence measure, denoted by 𝑐𝑚(𝑎) ∈ ℝ for 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴. Given the usual 
rationality assumptions (Pratt, 1964), decision-maker 𝑚 has a probability distribution 
over 𝐸𝑚 with measure 𝑝𝑚, and a utility function 𝑢𝑚: 𝑐𝑚(𝑎) → ℝ in the sense of (Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). 
Given a similar set of rationality assumptions at the group level, the group 
expected utility for alternative 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 can be written as 
𝑈𝐺(𝐴𝑘) =  ∑ 𝑘𝑚𝑈𝑚(𝐴𝑘) =  ∑ 𝑘𝑚(∑ 𝑝𝑚(𝐸𝑚𝑒)𝑢𝑚(𝑐𝑚𝑒
𝑜 (𝑎))
𝑚𝑛
𝑒=1 )
𝑛
𝑚=1    
𝑛
𝑚=1             (3) 
where 𝑐𝑚𝑒
𝑜 (𝑎) is decision-maker 𝑚’s consequence under event 𝐸𝑚𝑒 if they 
choose alternative 𝑎 and 𝑘𝑚 is the weight of decision-maker 𝑚’s expected utility in the 
group expected utility, such that  ∑ 𝑘𝑚 = 1𝑚∈𝑀  (Keeney, 2013). Prior work assumed that 
the decision-makers shared a common set of events, so 𝐸 = 𝐸𝑚 for all 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, and 
assumed that the group had a probability distribution formed by aggregating the 
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individual’s probability distributions and a utility function formed by aggregating the 
individual’s utility functions. Instead, the group expected utility can be formed by 
aggregating the individual’s expected utility (Keeney, 2013). 
In the multiple objective version, decision-maker 𝑚 evaluates the outcomes of 
the group’s decision on 𝑜𝑝 objectives, so the consequence measure becomes a vector 
𝑐𝑚𝑒(𝑎) = (𝑐𝑚𝑒
1 (𝑎),… , 𝑐𝑚𝑒
𝑜𝑚(𝑎)) for decision-maker 𝑚’s consequences under event 𝐸𝑚𝑒 if 
they choose alternative 𝑎. However, one does not need to specify entirely different sets 
of objectives for each decision-maker. Instead one can specify a single consequence 
measure 𝑐𝑒(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑚𝑒(𝑎) for all 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 and 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 and instead represent the preference 
asymmetry through the individual decision-maker’s utility functions 
𝑢𝑚(𝑐𝑚𝑒
1 (𝑎),… , 𝑐𝑚𝑒
𝑛𝑚(𝑎)). For example, if the individual utility functions can be represented 
in the linear-additive form 𝑢𝑚(𝑐𝑚𝑒
1 (𝑎),… , 𝑐𝑚𝑒
𝑛𝑚(𝑎)) = ∑ 𝑤𝑚
𝑜𝑝
𝑜=1 𝑢𝑚
𝑜 (𝑐𝑚𝑒
𝑜 (𝑎)) where 
∑ 𝑤𝑚
𝑜𝑝
𝑜=1 = 1 (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993), then the preference asymmetry can be 
represented by differences in the weights 𝑤𝑚
𝑜  across decision-makers. 
Keeney’s formulation (Keeney 2013) defines a rational group utility given a 
common set of alternatives. However, suppose the set of alternatives 𝐴𝑚 is different for 
each decision-maker 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀. If the decision-makers are collaborating, then one can 
simply consider all possible combinations of alternatives for each decision-maker, so 
𝐴 = 𝐴1 × 𝐴2 × …× 𝐴|𝑀|. However, if the group is not collaborating, then we have a game 
theoretic set-up. The interesting question here is how much group utility is lost by the 
lack of collaboration, where group utility is defined by (3). 
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Let us begin our discussion of this alternative formulation of a group decision by 
considering the case where |𝑀| = 2 and  |𝐴𝑚| = 2 for each decision-maker. Thus, we 
are considering the case where two decision-makers are each choosing between two 
different alternatives. As the alternatives chosen by each decision-maker effect the 
outcomes of each decision-maker on each objective, the result is a two-by-two game for 
each objective (see Figure 7).  
  
Player 2 
 
   
l r 
 
 
P
la
y
e
r 
 1
 
U 
𝑥1,𝑖(𝑈, 𝑙) 
 
𝑥1,𝑖(𝑈, 𝑟) 
  
  
𝑥2,𝑖(𝑈, 𝑙) 
 
𝑥2,𝑖(𝑈, 𝑟) 
 
 D 
𝑥1,𝑖(𝐷, 𝑙) 
 
𝑥1,𝑖(𝐷, 𝑟) 
  
  
𝑥2,𝑖(𝐷, 𝑙) 
 
𝑥2,𝑖(𝐷, 𝑟) 
 
        
Figure 7. Example of normal form game representing the outcomes of the 
possible choices by each decision-maker under the i-th objective. 
 
We use the traditional notation for simple two-by-two games by defining 𝐴1 =
{𝑈,𝐷} and 𝐴2 = {𝑙, 𝑟}. The two decision-makers each consider the same objectives in 
making their decision but can differ in the weights they assign to each objective.  We 
consider two objectives, i.e. 𝑛 = 2. In this approach, the outcomes of each objective 
under the alternatives chosen by each decision-maker can be represented as a normal 
form game. We then assume a linear-additive utility function for each decision- maker 
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𝑢𝑚(𝑐𝑚𝑒
1 (𝑎1, 𝑎2),… , 𝑐𝑚𝑒
𝑛𝑚(𝑎1, 𝑎2)) = ∑ 𝑤𝑚
𝑜𝑝
𝑜=1 𝑢𝑚
𝑜 (𝑐𝑚𝑒
𝑜 (𝑎1, 𝑎2)) , where  ∑ 𝑤𝑚
𝑜𝑝
𝑜=1 = 1. Figure 
8 shows the resulting normal form game in the utilities of each decision-maker for each 
combination of alternatives. 
  
Player 2  
  
l r  
P
la
y
e
r 
 1
 
U 
𝑢1,𝑈,𝑙 = 𝑤1,1𝑢1,1(𝑥1,1(𝑈, 𝑙)) + 𝑤1,2𝑢1,2(𝑥1,2(𝑈, 𝑙)) 𝑢1,𝑈,𝑟 = 𝑤1,1𝑢1,1(𝑥1,1(𝑈, 𝑟)) + 𝑤1,2𝑢1,2(𝑥1,2(𝑈, 𝑟))  
𝑢2,𝑈,𝑙 = 𝑤2,1𝑢2,1(𝑥2,1(𝑈, 𝑙)) + 𝑤2,2𝑢2,2(𝑥2,2(𝑈, 𝑙)) 𝑢2,𝑈,𝑟 = 𝑤2,1𝑢1(𝑥2,1(𝑈, 𝑟)) + 𝑤2,2𝑢2(𝑥2,2(𝑈, 𝑟))  
D 
𝑢1,𝐷,𝑙 = 𝑤1,1𝑢1,1(𝑥1,1(𝐷, 𝑙)) + 𝑤1,2𝑢1,2(𝑥1,2(𝐷, 𝑙)) 𝑢1,𝐷,𝑟 = 𝑤1,1𝑢1,1(𝑥1,1(𝐷, 𝑟) + 𝑤1,2𝑢1,2(𝑥1,2(𝐷, 𝑟))  
𝑢2,𝐷,𝑙 = 𝑤2,1𝑢2,1(𝑥2,1(𝐷, 𝑙)) + 𝑤2,2𝑢2,2(𝑥2,2(𝐷, 𝑙)) 𝑢2,𝐷,𝑟 = 𝑤2,1𝑢2,1(𝑥2,1(𝐷, 𝑟)) + 𝑤2,2𝑢2,2(𝑥2,2(𝐷, 𝑟))  
      
 
Figure 8. The normal form game considering each decision-makers two objective 
utility function. 
 
The group utility of a given choice is given by 
𝑈𝐺((𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗)) =  𝑘1 (𝑤1,1𝑢1,1 (𝑥1,1(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗)) + 𝑤1,2𝑢1,2 (𝑥1,2(𝑎𝑖 ,𝑎𝑗))) 
+𝑘2 (𝑤2,1𝑢2,1(𝑥2,1(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗)) + 𝑤2,2𝑢2,2(𝑥2,2(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗))),   (4) 
where 𝑘1 and 𝑘2 are the group weight for the two decision-makers. It is interesting to 
consider the difference between optimal group utility and the group utility of a Nash 
equilibrium for the game in Figure 8, or the group utility lost by failing to cooperate. In 
the following, we will assume that 𝑘1=𝑘2 =
1
2
. 
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3.2. Optimal Strategies in Collaborative and Non-Collaborative Group 
Decisions 
This formulation suggests an interesting complexity. Suppose the outcomes for 
each decision-maker under the first objective reward agreement, like in a “Matching 
Pennies” game, while the outcomes under the second objective reward disagreement, 
like in a “Disharmony” game. Figure 9 shows the formation of two objectives and each 
decision-maker’s utility for each alternative. 
The Nash equilibrium is a strategy where neither player can increase their 
expected utility by unilaterally deviating from the strategy. The Nash equilibrium can be 
a mixed strategy where each decision-maker chooses a strategy from a random 
distribution to obfuscate their choices or a pure strategy if there is a single alternative 
chosen by each decision-maker with certainty. 
The Nash equilibrium is the leading solution concept for Non-Cooperative games, 
where the decision-makers are not collaborating. When the decision-makers do 
collaborate, we can consider the Keeney (2013) formulation with the enlarged set of 
alternatives, specifically 𝐴 = {(𝑈, 𝑙), (𝑈, 𝑟), (𝐷, 𝑙), (𝐷, 𝑟)}.  
 
 
 
Edward Cook Draft Dissertation April 2019 
 
 
8 
 
“Matching 
Pennies” 
 
Player 2 
 
“Disharmony” 
 
Player 2 
 
   
l r 
    
l r 
 
 
P
la
y
e
r 
1
 
U 
1 
 
0 
   
P
la
y
e
r 
1
 
U 
0 
 
1 
  
  
1 
 
0 
   
0 
 
1 
 
 D 
0 
 
1 
   D 
1 
 
0 
  
  
0 
 
1 
   
1 
 
0 
 
                
Figure 9. Example of Normal Form Game representing plays on two attributes 
(“Matching Pennies” and “Disharmony”). 
 
We explore the behavior of games with multiple objectives by assuming different 
games for each objective. We consider nine games, seven common games from the 
literature plus two other games that describe commonly observed strategic interactions.  
In Figure 4, the two games in white are the nontraditional games. They are opposites of 
two other games and model some expected behavior which provided some interesting 
results.  We consider all combinations of these nine games in the formulation described 
in Figure 10.   
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Figure 10. The seven traditional games and the two nontraditional but related 
games that were used to explore Non-Cooperative decision-making behavior. 
 
3.3. An Example of Two Diners 
We take inspiration from the example in Keeney (2013) to illustrate our multiple 
objective game theory approach for Non-Cooperative decision-making.  Consider two 
people choosing where to go to dinner.  They have two shared objectives.  First, they 
wish to enjoy the food.  Second, they wish to enjoy the ambiance.  Diner 1 might focus 
on location and describes his alternatives as uptown and downtown.  Diner 2 might 
focus on cuisine style and describe her alternatives as Lebanese and Russian.  The 
utilities for the two diners for the two objectives are shown in Figure 11.  We use the 
notation “U” for the Uptown location and “D” for the Downtown location, along with “l” for 
the Lebanese restaurant and “r” for the Russian restaurant.   
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“Enjoy the 
Food” 
 
Diner 2 
 
“Ambiance” 
 
Diner 2 
 
   
l r 
    
l r 
 
 
D
in
e
r 
1
 
U 
1 
 
0 
   
D
in
e
r 
1
 
U 
1 
 
1 
  
  
1 
 
0 
   
0 
 
1 
 
 D 
0 
 
1 
   D 
0 
 
0 
  
  
0 
 
1 
   
0 
 
1 
 
                
Figure 11. Example of Normal Form Game representing two objectives about 
going to dinner. 
 
For this example, let’s further assume that there are four restaurants, one of each 
type in each location.  Both diners agree that the uptown Lebanese restaurant and the 
downtown Russian restaurant have the better food, but diner 1 likes the uptown scene 
no matter the restaurant whereas diner 2 prefers the ambience of Russian restaurants 
no matter the location.  We use “Matching Pennies” to model the diners’ objective to 
enjoy the food and construct a game, we call “Selfish”, to model the diners’ individual 
focus on ambiance. 
Although we have expanded on the framing of Keeney (2013) by not constraining 
the alternative set to be the same for each diner, we are constraining this example to 
have the decision-makers (diners) share the objectives.  We do this to make the 
example simpler.  We can imagine objectives held as important by only one decision-
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maker (Keeney, 2013).  To model this, we simply use zero payoffs for the decision-
maker that does not hold this objective as important. 
We can see the impact that these behaviors could have on the group decision.  
We can combine the two objectives in the diners’ example, “Matching Pennies” and 
“Selfish” based on the weighting, 𝑘𝑚, that each diner (decision-maker) has and create a 
single combined game that shows all the information of the individual diners’ 
preferences. In Figure 12’s left representation, 𝑚1 has 90% weighting on Objective 1 
while 𝑚2 has 10% weight on Objective 1.  In the right representation in Figure 12, 𝑚1 
still has 90% weighting on Objective 1, but 𝑚2 has changed her weightings so that she 
has 70% weight on Objective 1.   
 
P1 90% on Obj 1  
P2 10% on Obj 1 
Diner 2 (𝑚2) 
 
P1 90% on Obj 1  
P2 70% on Obj 1 
Diner 2 (𝑚2) 
 
   
l r 
    
l r 
 
 
D
in
e
r 
1
 (
𝑚
1
) U 
1 
 
0.1 
   
D
in
e
r 
1
 (
𝑚
1
) U 
1 
 
0.3 
  
  
0.1 
 
0.9 
   
0.95 
 
0.1 
 
 D 
0 
 
0.9 
   D 
0 
 
0.85 
  
  
0 
 
1 
   
0 
 
1 
 
                
Figure 12. Two Examples of Normal Form Games representing the combined 
objectives about going to dinner. 
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The result is an important shift.  In the right representation, there are pure 
strategy Nash equilibria in both (𝑈, 𝑙), an uptown Lebanese restaurant, and (𝐷, 𝑟), a 
downtown Russian restaurant, while the left representation has a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium in just (𝐷, 𝑟), a downtown Russian restaurant.  Note, both have a mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium as well.    
We can solve for the mixed strategy equilibrium.  Staying with the notation of 
Figure 12, we will need to introduce the probability that each decision-maker will place 
on a particular alternative.  We use the standard game notation for these probabilities. 
Let 𝑝 be the probability that 𝑚1 selects alternative "𝑈" and (𝑝 − 1) the probability 𝑚1 
selects alternative "𝐷".  Let 𝑞 be the probability that 𝑚2 selects alternative "𝑙" and (𝑞 −
1) be the probability that 𝑚2 selects alternative "𝑟". 
We stay with the solution concept from Nash (1951), and, using the utility 
equations from Figure 12, we can construct the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.  We 
set the probability of selection of an alternative weighted by the opposite decision-
maker’s utilities for that alternative equal to the probability of selection of the other 
alternate weighted by the opposite decision-maker’s utilities for that alternative.   
𝑝(𝑢2,𝑈,𝑙 + 𝑢2,𝑈,𝑟) = (1 − 𝑝)(𝑢2,𝐷,𝑙 + 𝑢2,𝐷,𝑟),     (5) 
𝑞(𝑢1,𝑈,𝑙 + 𝑢1,𝐷,𝑙) = (1 − 𝑞)(𝑢1,𝑈,𝑟 + 𝑢1,𝐷,𝑟)     (6) 
Solving for 𝑝 and 𝑞  
𝑝 = (𝑢2,𝐷,𝑟 − 𝑢2,𝑈,𝑟)/(𝑢2,𝑈,𝑙 + 𝑢2,𝑈,𝑟 − 𝑢2,𝐷,𝑙 − 𝑢2,𝐷,𝑟),     (7) 
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𝑞 = (𝑢1,𝐷,𝑟 − 𝑢1,𝑈,𝑟)/(𝑢1,𝑈,𝑙 + 𝑢1,𝑈,𝑟 − 𝑢1𝐷,𝑙 − 𝑢1,𝐷,𝑟),    (8) 
With these formulations, we can calculate the probability that each decision-
maker would have for each alternative when a pure strategy solution is not present and 
a mixed strategy solution must be used. Interpreting the left representation is straight 
forward because of the single Nash equilibrium.  No matter what the decision-maker 
weighting, 𝑘𝑚, is between the two diners for the final group answer, (𝐷, 𝑟) will be the 
alternative chosen since this is the equilibrium for each diner.  That is not true for the 
right representation.  Since there are two Nash equilibria, (𝑈, 𝑙) and (𝐷, 𝑟), depending on 
how the diners “solve” the game, they can get stuck on an inferior alternative. In Figure 
13, we see the behavior of group utility loss possible in some combinations of decision-
makers’ weightings on objectives. We further explore this notion of group utility loss in 
the examples below. 
 
Figure 13. Regions of Group Utility Lost in Non-Cooperative Decision-Making for 
two diners going to dinner. 
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3.4. Non-Cooperative Decision-Making 
To explore the behavior of the differences between the Nash equilibria and 
optimal group utility, we create surface plots of the two decision-makers’ weightings on 
Objective 1, as we did with the example of the two diners in Figure 12, with the height of 
the surface plot indicating the difference between the Nash equilibria and the optimal 
group utility.  In addition to this surface plot, we provide a map of the quadrants in which 
the pure strategy equilibria appear, to better understand the behavior of this group 
decision model. 
We can explore the impact of various combinations of standard games to see 
what their behaviors are and what the implications are.  The seven standard games plus 
the two added games make for thirty-six unique pairings.  We illustrate some of this 
group’s behavior with a few of these pairings: 
1. “Matching Pennies” and “Coordination” 
2. “Battle of the Sexes” and “Coordination” 
3. “Battle of the Sexes” and “Anti-Coordination” 
4. “Coordination” and “Hawk-Dove” 
5. “Deadlock” and “Hawk-Dove” 
Imagine that 𝑚1, the Manufacturing decision-maker, and 𝑚2, the Product 
Management decision-maker, have two objectives in common such that Objective 1, 
“Matching Pennies”, represents “Cost to Manufacture” and Objective 2, “Coordination”, 
represents “Quality” (Figure 14).  For  𝑚1, Manufacturing, the “U” alternative represents 
“Internal, Custom, Higher-Quality” and the “D” alternative represents “Outsourced, 
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Mass-Production, Lower-Quality”.  For 𝑚2, Product Management, “l” represents “Many 
Features” and “r” represents “Limited Features”.  For Objective 1, “Cost to 
Manufacture”, the decision-makers get utility only on (𝑈, 𝑙) and (𝐷, 𝑟).  For Objective 2, 
“Quality”, the situation is more complex.  The decision-makers wish to coordinate but 
have a clear ordering of alternative pair preferences with a many featured, internally 
custom-made, product at the highest level of utility, and an outsourced, mass 
manufacture, limited feature product at the lowest level of utility.   
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Figure 14. Example of two objectives modeled as “Matching Pennies” and 
“Coordination”. 
 
As we see in Figures 15 and 16 there are weightings where the two decision-
makers can rationally land on a Nash equilibrium and lose some of the available optimal 
group utility.  
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Figure 15. Regions of Group Utility Lost in Non-Cooperative Decision-Making for 
“Matching Pennies” versus “Coordination”.   
 
 
Figure 16. Regions of Pure Strategy Equilibria for “Matching Pennies” versus 
“Coordination”. 
 
1.00 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.99 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.98 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.97 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.96 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.95 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.94 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.93 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.92 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.91 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.90 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.89 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.88 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.87 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.86 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.85 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.84 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.83 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.82 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.81 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.80 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.79 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.78 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.77 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.76 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.75 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.74 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.73 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.72 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.71 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.70 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.69 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.68 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.67 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.66 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.65 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.64 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.63 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.62 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.61 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.60 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.59 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.58 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.57 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.56 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.55 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.54 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.53 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.52 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.51 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.50 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.49 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.48 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.47 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.46 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.45 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.44 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.43 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.42 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.40 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.39 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.38 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.37 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.36 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.35 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.34 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.33 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.32 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.31 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.30 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.29 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.28 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.27 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.26 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.25 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.24 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.23 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.22 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.21 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.20 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.19 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.18 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.17 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.16 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.15 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.13 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.12 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.10 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.09 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.08 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.07 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.06 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.05 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.04 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.03 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.02 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.01 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.00 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00
P2 weight 
on Obj 1 
0%     P1 weight on Objective 1                 
100% 
{𝑈, 𝑙} Nash 
equilibrium  
{𝐷, 𝑟} Nash 
equilibrium 
 {𝑈, 𝑙} 
Cooperative 
apporach 
Mixed strategy 
equilibrium  
100% 
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In the example with “Matching Pennies” and “Coordination” as the two games 
used to model objectives, Figure 14 shows the objectives described as two normal-form 
games.  The payoffs are all scaled from 0 to 1.  Figure 15 shows the difference between 
the pure strategy Nash equilibria and the optimal group utility.  This is a representation 
of the loss that the pair of decision-makers will have if they approach the decision as a 
Non-Cooperative process.  Where there is no loss, there is either only one pure strategy 
equilibrium, or only a mixed strategy equilibrium.  In these cases, there is no difference 
between the Non-Cooperative (game theoretic) and Cooperative (Keeney 2013) 
approaches. 
Although Figure 15 (and the others like it) does not give a complete view of the 
behavior, it is enough to show that there is the possibility of loss with a Non-Cooperative 
approach to group decision-making.   Figure 16 explains more of the behavior by 
showing the location by quadrant of the equilibria.  Note that this example shows the 
presence of both the single Nash equilibrium and the mixed-strategy equilibrium.  These 
correspond with the blue area on Figure 15indicating that there is no loss of group 
utility.  It is only the region where 𝑚1 weights Objective 1 between 0% and 20% that 
there will be any group utility loss. 
This provides some insight into the underlying behavior of this group decision 
model and the changes that will occur, not only in the loss of group utility (Cost of 
Conflict), but also in the alternative set that is chosen depending on the weighting of the 
objectives by the decision-makers.   
Edward Cook Draft Dissertation April 2019 
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Figure 17. Example of two objectives modeled as “Battle of the Sexes” and 
“Coordination”. 
 
For the example shown in Figure 17, we continue with the two decision-makers, 
𝑚1, Manufacturing, and 𝑚2, Product Management.  We also keep Objective 2, 
“Coordination”, to represent “Quality”, but now we change Objective 1 to “Battle of the 
Sexes” as a representation of “Employee Engagement”.  We can think of this as 
“Manufacturing” preferring to make high quality, many featured products with their 
skilled workers but accepting that limited feature products are better made by mass 
market techniques.  For “Product Management”, the move to mass market production 
could be how they see their engagement in the future, but they accept that there is 
some value in many featured, custom products.  Neither group sees employee 
engagement in many featured, mass-made products or limited feature, custom-made 
products.   
Edward Cook Draft Dissertation April 2019 
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Figure 18. Regions of Group Utility Lost in Non-Cooperative Decision-Making for 
“Battle of the Sexes” and “Coordination”. 
 
Figure 19. Regions of Pure Strategy Equilibria for “Battle of the Sexes” and 
“Coordination”. 
 
1.00 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 11
0.99 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.98 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.97 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.96 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.95 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.94 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.93 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.92 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.91 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.90 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.89 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.88 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.87 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.86 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.85 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.84 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.83 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.82 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.81 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.80 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.79 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.78 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.77 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.76 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.75 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.74 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.73 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.72 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.71 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.70 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.69 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.68 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.67 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.66 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.65 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.64 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.63 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.62 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.61 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.60 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.59 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.58 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.57 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.56 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.55 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.54 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.53 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.52 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.51 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.50 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.49 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.48 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.47 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.46 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.45 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.44 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.43 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.42 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.40 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.39 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.38 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.37 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.36 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.35 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.34 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.33 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.32 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.31 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.30 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.29 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.28 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.27 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.26 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.25 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.24 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.23 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.22 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.21 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.20 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.19 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.18 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.17 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.16 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.15 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.13 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.12 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.10 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.09 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.08 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.07 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.06 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.05 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.04 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.03 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.02 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.01 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.00 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00
P2 weight 
on Obj 1 
0%     P1 weight on Objective 1                 
100% 
{𝐷, 𝑟} Nash 
equilibrium 
{𝑈, 𝑙} 
Cooperative 
Approach 
100% 
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In Figure 15 with “Matching Pennies” and “Coordination” as the two objective 
models, we see that 𝑚1 controls the location of the interesting behavior while 𝑚2 
contributes only to the magnitude of impact that a Non-Cooperative decision-making 
process will have.  Contrast the example in Figure 15 with Figure 18 “Battle of the 
Sexes” and “Coordination” as the two objective models, where both 𝑚1and 𝑚2 have 
influence throughout the weighting space for the objectives.  The change from an 
objective with half of the payoffs as zero, but spread to all four quadrants, for one that 
also has half the payoffs as zero, but concentrated in two quadrants changes the 
behavior, so that now the influence is across the entire weighting space.  Additionally, 
altering the third payoff amount in “Battle of the Sexes”, 0.5, to be closer to 1 or closer 
to 0, changes the elevation of the plane but not the general form.  It is the structure of 
the objectives (games) in terms of the payoff ordering that is influential here.  Later in 
the paper, we will see that the variety and magnitude of the payoffs contribute to the 
variety and magnitude of the difference between the Nash equilibria and the optimal 
group equilibrium.   
Pairing “Anti-Coordination” with “Coordination”, as in Figure 17, generates yet 
another behavior.  As seen in Figure 18, the region of interest is now symmetrical with 
mixed strategy equilibria creating the flat plane areas as in the “Matching Pennies” and 
“Coordination” example but also two symmetrical areas of sloping difference between 
the Nash equilibrium and the optimal group utility.  This makes for an interesting point 
around the region where both decision-makers weight the two objectives equally, 𝑘1 =
𝑘2 =
1
2
.  Small changes in those weightings will change the optimal group and Nash 
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equilibria alternatives.  Since this is a trough, the amount of group loss will not be 
significant but the variety of alternatives with such small changes is of interest. 
The driver for this behavior is the symmetrical nature of the two alternatives.  The 
combined normal form, after the two objectives have been brought together, is in the 
same form as the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” game with an optimal value for 𝑚1 and 𝑚2 
(without reference to the group utility) but a construct of the game (combined objectives) 
that will lead them to the inferior choice.  This is true irrespective of the weighting 
between the two decision-makers.  Other combinations of the games modeled as 
objectives generated this behavior suggesting a class of combinations that should be 
considered in the same light as the solution to “Prisoner’s Dilemma”. 
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Figure 20. Example of two objectives modeled as “Coordination” and “Anti-
Coordination”. 
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For the example in Figure 20, we keep Objective 2, “Coordination”, to represent 
“Quality” but now bring in an opposing structure for Objective 1, “Anti-Coordination”” to 
represent “Cost”. 
 
Figure 21. Regions of Group Utility Lost in Non-Cooperative Decision-Making for 
“Coordination” and “Anti-Coordination”. 
 
Figure 22. Regions of Pure Strategy Equilibria for “Coordination” and “Anti-
Coordination”. 
 
P2 weight 
on Obj 1 
0%     P1 weight on Objective 1                 
100% {𝐷, 𝑟} Nash 
equilibrium 
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Mixed strategy 
equilibrium  
Mixed strategy 
equilibrium  
{𝑈, 𝑙} Nash 
equilibrium  
{𝐷, 𝑟} Cooperative 
Approach 
 {𝐷, 𝑟} Optimal 100% 
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The three previous examples were all combinations with the “Coordination” and 
“Anti-Coordination” games as one of the objectives.  This was useful in showing the 
variety of behavior of relatively simple games as the models for the objectives.  The 
following examples use games with more payoffs across the four quadrants.   
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Figure 23. Example of two objectives modeled as “Coordination” and “Hawk-
Dove”. 
 
Figure 23 shows an example with a coordination game for one objective and 
hawk-dove for the other. As we can see in Figure 24, having payoffs, in all four 
quadrants for both games, generates more interesting behavior.  In this example, the 
variety of behavior has increased.  All the combinations using “Hawk-Dove” as an 
objective produce a saddle-like behavior which can be seen in Figure 24.  Additionally, 
Figure 25 shows that there are considerable differences in the Nash equilibrium 
alternative and the optimal group alternative as the weightings, that the decision-makers 
Edward Cook Draft Dissertation April 2019 
 
 
24 
 
place on the objectives, change.  These changes are attributable to having two 
objectives with multiple possible payoffs across all four quadrants.   
 
 
Figure 24. Regions of Group Utility Lost in Non-Cooperative Decision-Making for 
“Coordination” and “Hawk-Dove”. 
 
This variety creates two things.  First, as in the examples of Figures 14 and 20, 
there is enough variety that there are payoff combinations that create mixed strategy 
only solutions.  Second, again because of the variety of payoffs, there are regimes 
where the payoffs come together to generate more than one Nash equilibria and with 
that a greater difference with the optimal group utility.  The peaks that are shown in 
Figure 24 indicate differences that are greater than any of the other examples.  Across 
all the combinations, “Hawk-Dove” and the other more complex games generated areas 
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of greater difference than those of “Matching Pennies”, “Harmony”, and “Battle of the 
Sexes” which have more zero payoffs and less differentiated payoff values.  Thus, there 
was less difference in the Nash equilibrium and the Optimal group utility.  
 
 
Figure 25. Regions of Pure Strategy Equilibria for “Coordination” and “Hawk-
Dove”. 
 
Finally, we see different behavior with other combinations as in Figure 26.  In this 
example, we see the greatest amount of group utility loss in the objective combinations 
as well as the characteristic trough of “Hawk-Dove”.  Since “Deadlock” has an 
equilibrium as part of its structure, the effect is to create both symmetry in the group 
utility loss surface plot and to increase the magnitude of the group utility loss at the 
peak.  This behavior for “Deadlock” appears throughout its other combinations as well.  
 
 
1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.98 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.96 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.94 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.93 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.83 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.78 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.74 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.73 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.69 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.68 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 41 41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 41 41 41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 41 41 41 41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 41 41 41 41 41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.50 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
0.49 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
0.48 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
0.47 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
0.46 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
0.45 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
0.44 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
0.43 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
0.42 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
0.41 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
0.40 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
0.39 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
0.38 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
0.37 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
0.36 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
0.35 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
0.34 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
0.33 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.31 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.30 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.29 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.28 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.27 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.26 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.25 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.24 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.23 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.22 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.21 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.20 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.19 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.18 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.17 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.16 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.15 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.14 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.13 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.12 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.11 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.10 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.09 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.08 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.07 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.06 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.05 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.04 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.03 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.02 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.01 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.00 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00
P2 weight 
on Obj 1 
0%     P1 weight on Objective 1                 
 100% 
100% 
Mixed strategy 
equilibrium  
{𝑈, 𝑟} Nash 
equilibrium 
{𝐷, 𝑙}  Cooperative 
approach 
Mixed strategy 
equilibrium  
{𝐷, 𝑟} Nash equilibrium 
{𝑈, 𝑙} Cooperative 
Approach 
{𝑈, 𝑟}  Nash equilibrium 
 
{𝐷, 𝑙} Nash 
Equilibrium 
{𝑈, 𝑙} Nash 
Equilibrium 
{𝑈, 𝑙} Nash 
{𝐷, 𝑟} 
Optimal 
Equilibrium 
100% 
{𝐷, 𝑙} Nash equilibrium 
{𝑈, 𝑟} Cooperative Approach 
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The equilibrium inherent in the “Deadlock” objective also has the influence of reducing 
the change in alternatives as the weightings of the decision-makers change.   
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Figure 26. Example of two objectives modeled as “Deadlock” and “Hawk-Dove”. 
 
 
Figure 27. Regions of Group Utility Lost in Non-Cooperative Decision-Making for 
“Deadlock” and “Hawk-Dove”. 
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Figure 28. Regions of Pure Strategy Equilibria for “Deadlock” and “Hawk-Dove”. 
 
Table 2 shows a summary of these findings.  Since we are using a linear additive 
function, the order of objective pairings does not produce a different result, so those 
repeated pairs are grayed out.  Also, pairing the same game together as two objectives 
simply produces the same game structure, so those pairs are blacked out.  The table 
indicates if the full space has a group utility loss or just partial.  If partial, the table shows 
what the reason is for preventing a loss, either it is a mixed strategy region only, or 
there is only one equilibrium.  To have a loss, there must be at least two equilibria in the 
final combined form. 
3.5. Summary of Findings and Implications 
1. All paired games show some combinations of objective weights for the decision-
makers where there exists more than one pure strategy Nash equilibrium.   
 
1.00 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.99 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.98 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.97 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.96 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.95 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.94 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.93 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.92 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.91 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.90 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.89 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.88 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.87 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.86 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.85 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.84 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.83 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.82 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.81 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.80 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.79 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.78 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.77 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.76 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.75 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.74 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.73 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.72 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.71 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.70 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.69 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.68 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.67 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.66 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.65 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.64 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.63 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.62 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.61 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.60 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.59 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.58 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.57 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.56 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.55 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.54 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.53 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.52 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.51 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
0.50 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
0.49 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.48 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.47 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.46 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.45 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.44 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.43 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.42 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.41 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.40 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.39 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.38 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.37 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.36 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.35 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.34 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.33 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.31 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.30 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.29 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.28 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.27 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.26 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.25 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.24 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.23 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.22 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.21 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.20 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.19 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.18 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.17 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.16 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.15 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.14 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.13 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.12 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.11 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.10 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.09 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.08 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.07 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.06 32 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.05 32 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.04 32 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.03 32 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.02 32 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.01 32 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.00 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00
{𝐷, 𝑙} Nash equilibrium 
{𝑈, 𝑟} Cooperative 
Approach 
{𝑈, 𝑟} Nash equilibrium 
 
{𝑈, 𝑟}  
Nash equilibrium 
{𝐷, 𝑙} Cooperative 
Approach 
{𝐷, 𝑙} Nash 
Equilibrium 
{𝐷, 𝑟} Nash equilibrium 
{𝑈, 𝑙} Cooperative Approach 
P2 weight 
on Obj 1 
0%     P1 weight on Objective 1                 
100% 
100% 
Edward Cook Draft Dissertation April 2019 
 
 
28 
 
Table 2. Results of the Pairings of Games Indicating if the entire region (or part) 
has a difference between the Nash equilibrium and the optimal group utility. 
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Partial 
(1 Nash & 
Mixed) 
Partial 
(Mixed) 
Partial 
(Mixed) 
Partial 
(Mixed) 
Partial 
(Mixed) 
Partial 
(1 Nash & 
Mixed) 
Partial 
(Mixed) 
Partial 
(1 Nash & 
Mixed) 
Harmony   Full Full 
Partial 
(1 Nash & 
Mixed) 
Full 
Partial 
(1 Nash) 
Partial 
(1 Nash & 
Mixed) 
Full 
Battle of the 
Sexes 
   Full 
Partial 
(1 Nash & 
Mixed) 
Full 
Partial 
(1 Nash) 
Partial 
(Mixed) 
Full 
Coordination     
Partial 
(Mixed) 
Full Full 
Partial 
(Mixed) 
Full 
Anti-coordination      
Partial 
(1 Nash & 
Mixed) 
Partial 
(1 Nash & 
Mixed) 
Full 
Partial 
(1 Nash & 
Mixed) 
Prisoner’s 
Dilemma 
      Full 
Partial 
(1 Nash & 
Mixed) 
Full 
Deadlock        
Partial 
(1 Nash & 
Mixed) 
Partial 
(1 Nash) 
Hawk-Dove         
Partial 
(1 Nash & 
Mixed) 
Stag Hunt         
 
 
 
2. Many pairings show a steep change in the group utility loss indicating that a 
small change in one of the decision-makers weights on an objective could 
generate a change in the “Cost of conflict” obtained and even the alternative 
chosen.    
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3. More non-zero payoffs in an objective create more instances of Nash equilibria 
and greater variety in change in the difference between the Nash equilibrium and 
the group optimal utility. 
a.  “Stag Hunt”, “Coordination”, and “Anti-Coordination” show the most 
differences.  All three of these have payoffs in all four of their quadrants 
b. “Matching Pennies”, “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, and “Deadlock” have payoffs in 
all four quadrants but two of those quadrants have payoffs for only one 
decision-maker.  
c. “Hawk-Dove” has payoffs in three quadrants and shows interesting 
behavior in most pairings. 
d. “Harmony” and “Battle of the Sexes” have payoffs only in two quadrants 
on the diagonal.   
4. Another factor was in the possibilities for combinations based on the variety of 
payoffs in the two objectives.  The games modeling the objectives were scaled to 
have five payoffs (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1).  The more possible payoffs between the 
two objectives the more varied the behavior across the objective weighting 
space.   
a. “Matching Pennies” and “Harmony” have only 1 and 0 as payoffs.  They 
had singular continuous planes as the difference between the Nash 
equilibrium and optimal group utility. 
b. “Battle of the Sexes” has three payoff values and all others had four payoff 
values.  These combinations produced the most varied changes between 
the Nash equilibrium and optimal group utility. 
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The relative values of the payoffs clearly had impact, but the actual values 
themselves matter as well.  For example, an objective modeled as a game with payoffs 
(0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75) when combined with another objective has the same structure as an 
objective modeled as a game with payoffs (0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1), but shifted in the 
weighting space.  Additionally, other game types can be imagined which could reveal 
other behavior in the games not shown by the pairings in Table 2. 
We can summarize the implications of this work in three key points: 
1. Non-Cooperative approaches are often sub-optimized for the group:  As 
Nash (1951) described, the Non-Cooperative approach does not necessarily find 
the optimal solution.  In the combination of the various objective weights, the 
optimal for any individual can deviate from the group optimal.   
2. Objective weighting drives outcomes:  There are identifiable points where the 
outcomes change as the weights decision-makers place on each objective are 
varied.  Even the simple two objective model shows some interesting behavior.  
As the weight that each player places on the two objectives changes, the number 
and location of Nash equilibria changes.   
3. Cooperation needs a signal: To discover the group optimal solution, the 
decision-makers will need a signal to let them know what the possible full 
impacts are of their decisions.  As the objectives increase and the number of 
decision-makers increase, their ability to discern the impact for any player will 
become more difficult and discerning the group optimal solution will become too 
difficult without some aided approach for the decision-makers. 
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3.6. Increasing Objectives 
Exploring the impact of more objectives would provide a way to understand the 
changing nature of the final decision solution.  We assume the same linear-additive 
utility function for each decision-maker as described at the beginning of this section:  
𝑢𝑚(𝑐𝑚𝑗
1 (𝑎1, 𝑎2),… , 𝑐𝑚𝑗
𝑛𝑚(𝑎1, 𝑎2)) = ∑ 𝑤𝑚
𝑜𝑝
𝑜=1 𝑢𝑚
𝑜 (𝑐𝑚𝑒
𝑜 (𝑎1, 𝑎2)) , where  ∑ 𝑤𝑚
𝑜𝑝
𝑜=1 = 1. 
For these repeated trials, we increase 𝑛, the number of objectives, and examine 𝑛 =
3, 4, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5. The number of decision-makers remains as 𝑀 = |2| and the number of 
alternatives for each decision-maker, 𝑚, as 𝐴 = |2|.  Since we are beyond three-
dimensional graphing, we use Monte Carlo Analysis to examine the “Cost of conflict” 
(the reduction in utility with non-cooperation) across 1,000 iterations in order to see the 
distribution.  Figure 29 shows the distributions for the different number of objectives.   In 
each repeated trial the objectives were randomly selected via a uniform distribution 
unique to each objective.  The weight on the objectives by the two decision-makers was 
randomly selected via a uniform distribution unique to each decision-maker for each 
objective. 
The tightening of the range of the “Cost of Conflict” is shows the mollifying effect 
that the increase in number of objectives has on the range of possible outcomes.  The 
objectives are effectively cancelling out the impact of the other objectives as their 
number increases.  Nevertheless, the range of the potential “Cost of Conflict” remains 
high with as much as 40% possible event with 5 objectives.  The middle two quartiles 
still contain 10% “Cost of Conflict” with 5 objectives.  Figure 29 shows that meaningful 
utility can be lost to the group across this entire range of objectives.   
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Figure 29. The Cost of Conflict with 2 to 5 objectives. 
3.7. Contributions from the “Cost of Conflict” 
Understanding that there are political behaviors in group decision-making is not 
new but re casting this game theoretic approach to be able to explore the behavior of 
supply chain coordination problems is insightful. As we showed in the above examples 
the construct of applying a Nash equilibrium as a solution concept for a game theoretic 
view of supplier-customer interactions can reveal where there is loss to the group utility 
because of the “Cost of Conflict”.  Using this approach as signal for two parties to see 
that there is a better solution will help them to move off of the Nash equilibrium on onto 
the Paretto solution. 
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Chapter 4. Social Network and Group Decisions 
Game Theory provides an approach to understanding how the interaction of 
decision-makers impacts the group utility received from each objective.  In a sense, this 
creates a process whereby the group can self-discover the interaction and impact of 
each decision-makers preferences on the overall group utility without the necessity of a 
decision analyst or some other facilitator to drive the process for them.  The weighting of 
the decision-makers themselves (the 𝑘𝑚′𝑠 in Equation 2) remains as an element of the 
process to be improved.  Additionally, we now make a clear distinction between 
decision-maker and stakeholder.  Decision-makers are those whose preferences are 
directly included in the group decision.  They are the actors in Equation 2.  Stakeholders 
are the broader set of people that include decision-makers but also include those that 
influence decision-makers.  Some stakeholders are not actors as in Equation 2; 
however, it is important to study them in a group decision because they influence what 
we will shortly define: Decision Power.  Network Theory provides a tool to handle both 
issues: discovery of decision-maker weighting and impact of other stakeholders on the 
decision process. 
The structure of knowledge transfer through a network was defined by Regan 
and McKelvey (2003) building on work in sharing best practices (Szulanski, 1996), new 
product development (Hansen, 1999) and even organizational survival (Baum and 
Ingram, 1998).  Others have offered a knowledge-based theory of the firm where teams 
are social communities, where success is determined by efficient knowledge creation 
(by the individual) and dissemination (to the team).  The effectiveness of this knowledge 
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transfer is inferred to be from the strength of the ties between each person (Uzzi, 1996, 
1997, 1999; Hansen, 1999).  Hansen (1999) argued that the stronger the tie the better 
the ability to transmit complex knowledge.  Regan and McKelvey (2003) go beyond the 
strength of a tie to consider how network structure, social cohesion, and network range 
affect the knowledge transfer process. 
Of continued interest and study is the “closeness” of networks often described as 
degrees of separation.  Interestingly, for many social networks, the average number 
connections (vertices) along a path can be very few compared to the length of a path.  
This result is referred to as the “small world” phenomenon which was famously coined 
and then studied by Travers and Milgram (1969), with further study by Pool and Kochen 
(1979), Watts and Strogatz (1998), as well as others.  This has implications for 
understanding the true boundaries of networks in that the level of dense connections 
that are typically found make it difficult to discern a boundary to the network.  An 
exogenously defined boundary as studied by Krackhardt & Stern (1988) and Lazega, 
(2001) are defined by some clear definition such as the confines of a city.  An 
endogenously defined boundary initially defined by Freeman, Fararo, Bloomberg, and 
Sunshine (1963) is related to the group itself such as the data scientists within a 
business.  Neither approach is definitive unless the boundary is truly crisp, therefore, 
choice of the boundary must be made carefully so as not to exclude a significant 
influencing stakeholder. 
The study of networks themselves can be predictive of important characteristics 
of human behavior.  Structural properties have been shown to be predictive of team 
performance and individual satisfaction at work as described by Bavelas & Barrett 
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(1951), but also on work power and influence in decision-making as studied by Brass 
(1984) and even success in bargaining and competitive settings as outlined by Burt 
(1992).  All of these are relevant to the study of group decision-making in that they 
highlight how stakeholders are influencing each other as a significant determinant of the 
process groups use to make decisions. 
4.1. Social Network Theory Background 
Social networks across multiple decision-makers can be described as a graph.  A 
graph is a structure that shows the relationship or lack of relationship between entities.  
It consists of two elements: vertices which are the entities, representing in this case 
stakeholders and decision-makers, and edges, which show the relationship between the 
vertices (stakeholders and decision-makers).  More formally, a graph, G can be 
represented as 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) where V is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges.  The 
number of each of these elements can be represented using the cardinality operator.  
The number of vertices indicates the order of the graph, 𝑛 = |𝑉| where n is the indicator 
of order.  Set theory notation can be used to describe the groupings of elements of the 
graph.  To understand the influence that one vertex may have over another, it is useful 
to know if the vertices are “connected.”  This would mean that there is a distinct set of 
vertices in series that (with their edges) create a path between two vertices.  The 
existence of the path implies that the vertices could have influence over each other.   
There are many ways to describe networks via graph theory at both the macro-
level of the entire graph (stakeholder network) as well as the individual node-level 
(stakeholder).  Many of these can be grouped into the broad category of centrality.  
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Bonacich (2012) places centrality measures into two broad categories: those that 
measure how important a node is in the flow through the network (often measured by 
shortest path) and those that measure the prominence of a node by its position (often 
measured as unique connections) in the graph.  For the purpose of measuring the 
decision-power of a stakeholder, we will use the latter type of measure.      
4.2. Social Networks and Influence in Strategic Group Decisions 
In this research, we develop a theory of “decision power”, the influence of 
stakeholders on a group decision, using social network theory. 
The form of the decision-power weighting of a stakeholder will come in two parts.  
We consider the stated or extrinsic decision-power weight of stakeholder 𝑚, denoted 
𝑤′𝑚, as compared to their intrinsic weight, denoted 𝑤𝑚, that they would use if making a 
decision without the influence of other stakeholders.  Consider a group decision with 𝑝 
objectives, indexed 𝑜 = 1, … , 𝑝, to be made by 𝑛 decision-makers, indexed 𝑚 = 1,… , 𝑛. 
Decision maker 𝑚 has the intrinsic weight 𝑘𝑜𝑚 on the 𝑜-th objective, but her publicly 
announced (extrinsic) weight, denoted 𝑘′𝑜𝑚, is influenced by the other decision-makers. 
Let 𝑋 be an 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix representing connectedness in the social network of the 
decision-makers, so 𝑥𝑚,𝑗 > 0 if decision-maker, 𝑗, influences the weights of decision-
maker, 𝑚, and the magnitude represents the strength of the influence. We assume that  
𝑥𝑚,𝑚 = 0 for all 𝑚 and ∑ 𝑥𝑚,𝑗
𝑛
𝑚=1 = 1.  Following DeGroot (1974), each decision-maker’s 
extrinsic weight is a weighted sum of their intrinsic weight and the result of the influence 
of the extrinsic weights of the decision-makers who influence them. Let 𝜏𝑚 ∈ [0,1] 
represent decision-maker 𝑚’s susceptibility to influence by other decision-makers and 
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1 − 𝜏𝑚 represent decision-maker 𝑚’s reliance on her opinion. Decision-maker 𝑚’s 
weight on the 𝑜-th objective is then given by 
𝑘𝑜𝑚
′ = (1 − 𝜏𝑚 )𝑘𝑜𝑚 + 𝜏𝑚  ∑ 𝑥𝑗,𝑚𝑘𝑜𝑚
′𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑚
.    (9) 
Let 𝑇 denote a diagonal matrix of the 𝜏𝑚 then (9) can be re-written in matrix form 
𝐾′ = (1 − 𝑇)𝐾 + 𝑇𝑋𝐾′.     (10) 
This strength of connection can be determined in several ways.  A few that are 
well described in the literature are: 
1. Out Degree: The out degree is defined as the number of directed edges that 
leave a vertex.  Using this approach assumes an equal weighting of vertices 
importance and then measures the number of connections that particular vertex 
has. 
2. Swing Weights:  Outlined by Keeney and Raifa (1976), this approach relies on 
the skill of a decision analyst to guide the stakeholders in making an assessment 
of their relative importance to a particular group decision. 
3. Network Proxies:  As described by Culota (2004) and Leskovec (2008), this 
approach uses a proxy measure such as number of emails or text messages 
going between decision-makers and stakeholders as an indirect, but empirical, 
measure of strength of connection. 
4. Formal Position: This is the formal role that a Stakeholder has in an organization.  
It is often, but not always, expressed as a title such a Vice President. This is 
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readily determined through a formal organizational chart or human resources 
management system. 
We think of the influence between stakeholders as a directed graph. 
4.3. Deriving Extrinsic Weights 
We can solve for the extrinsic weights using  
𝐾′ = (𝐼 − 𝑇𝑋)−1(1 − 𝑇)𝐾.      (11) 
Thus, the term (𝐼 − 𝑇𝑋)−1(1 − 𝑇) determines the combination of the individual’s 
intrinsic weights and other stakeholder’s intrinsic weights into each individual’s extrinsic 
weights. This form does not simplify neatly because the inverse of 𝐼 − 𝑇𝑋 involves a 
polynomial of order 𝑛. To understand the implications, we will study its form for specific 
network structures with four decision makers. 
4.3.1. Hub and Spoke 
Suppose one decision maker has a central role in the network (see Figure 30), 
which implies that 
𝑋 = (
0 𝑥1,2 𝑥1,3 𝑥1,4
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
). 
Algebraic substitution of 𝑋 for the Hub and Spoke configuration into (11) and 
simplification yields 
𝑘𝑜1
′ =
(1−𝜏1)𝑘𝑜1+𝜏1∑ (1−𝜏𝑗)𝑥1,𝑗𝑘𝑜𝑗𝑗≠1
1−∑ 𝜏1𝜏𝑗𝑥1,𝑗𝑗≠1
       (12a) 
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and  
𝑘𝑜𝑚
′ =
(1−𝜏𝑚)(1−𝜏1∑ 𝜏𝑗𝑥1,𝑗𝑚≠1&𝑗≠𝑚 )𝑘𝑜𝑚+𝜏𝑚(1−𝜏1)𝑘𝑜1+𝜏𝑚𝜏1(∑ (1−𝜏𝑗)𝑥1,𝑗𝑘𝑜𝑗𝑗≠1&𝑗≠𝑚 )
1−∑ 𝜏1𝜏𝑗𝑥1,𝑗𝑗≠1
  (12b) 
 for 𝑚 ≠ 1. Each decision maker’s extrinsic weight is a convex combination of 
their intrinsic weight and the other decision maker’s weights. We examine next the 
relative influences of each on the extrinsic weight.  
 
Figure 30. The network structure for the Hub and Spoke configuration. 
 
The form of the hub decision maker’s extrinsic weight in (12a) is simpler because she is 
connected to each spoke decision maker, but they are not connected to anyone else. 
The form for the spoke decision maker’s extrinsic weight in (12b) is more complex as 
they are connected to the hub decision maker, but she is then connected to the other 
two spoke decision makers. The nested parentheses in (12a) and (12b) show the nature 
of the direct and indirect influence on the extrinsic weights. 
1
2
43
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In calculating the hub decision maker’s extrinsic weight, her intrinsic weight is 
multiplied by a term proportional to 1 − 𝜏1, while for spoke decision maker m’s extrinsic 
weight, their intrinsic weight is multiplied by a term proportional to  (1 − 𝜏𝑚)(1 −
∑ 𝜏1𝜏𝑗𝑥1,𝑗𝑗≠1&𝑗≠𝑚 ). Thus, the hub decision maker will rely more on their own intrinsic 
weight if 𝜏1 is low, but for spoke decision-maker 𝑚 to rely on his own intrinsic weight 
requires his 𝜏𝑚 to be low, and he has to resist second order influence of the other spoke 
decision-makers through the hub decision maker, represented by 
(1 − 𝜏1∑ 𝜏𝑗𝑥1,𝑗𝑗≠1&𝑗≠𝑚 ). 
In calculating the hub decision maker’s extrinsic weight, the spoke decision 
maker 𝑗’s intrinsic weight (𝑗 ≠ 1) is multiplied by a term proportional to 𝜏1(1 − 𝜏𝑗)𝑥1,𝑗. 
Thus, the hub decision maker can be influenced by a spoke decision maker if 𝜏1 is high, 
the spoke decision maker’s 𝜏𝑗 is low, and the network influence of the spoke decision 
maker on the hub decision maker (𝑥1,𝑗) is high. In calculating spoke decision maker 𝑚’s 
extrinsic weight, the hub decision maker’s intrinsic weight is multiplied by a term 
proportional to 𝜏𝑚(1 − 𝜏1) and spoke decision maker 𝑗’s intrinsic weight (𝑗 ≠ 1) is 
multiplied by a term proportional to 𝜏1𝜏𝑚(1 − 𝜏𝑗)𝑥1,𝑗. Thus, the hub decision maker can 
influence spoke decision maker 𝑚’s extrinsic weight if their 𝜏1 is low and the spoke 
decision maker’s 𝜏𝑚 is high. Another spoke decision maker can influence spoke 
decision maker 𝑚’s extrinsic weight only through hub decision maker, requiring that the 
spoke decision maker’s 𝜏𝑚 and the hub decision maker’s 𝜏1 are high and the other 
spoke decision maker relies on their own opinion (low 𝜏𝑗) and the network influence of 
the spoke decision maker on the hub decision maker (𝑥1,𝑗) is high. 
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In most group settings, decision analysts simply average the stated (extrinsic) 
weights of each decision maker on a given objective (∑ 𝑘𝑜𝑚
′𝑛
𝑚=1 𝑛⁄ ).  However, as we 
have seen, depending on the network influence structure of the group and the group 
member’s reliance on their own opinion versus that of others, the relative influence of a 
given decision maker’s intrinsic weight could be lower or higher than 1 𝑛⁄ . We can 
calculate the effect of 𝑘𝑜𝑚 on the group weight. The relative importance of the hub 
decision maker’s intrinsic weight in the group weight is proportional to 
(1 − 𝜏1)(1 + ∑ 𝜏𝑗𝑗≠1 ), 
while the relative importance of spoke decision maker m’s intrinsic weight in the 
group weight is proportional to 
(1 − 𝜏𝑚)(1 + 𝜏1𝑥1,m + ∑ 𝜏1𝜏𝑗(𝑥1,m − 𝑥1,j)𝑗≠1orm ). 
Each decision maker’s intrinsic weight will be more important in the group weight 
if they rely on their own opinion (i.e. their own 𝜏𝑚 is low). However, they can also have 
more effect on the group weight through other decision makers. The hub decision 
maker has her own effect plus her effect on the spoke decision makers if they are 
susceptible, i.e. their 𝜏𝑚 is high. The spoke decision makers also have their own effect 
plus their influence on the hub decision maker, expressed by 𝜏1𝑥1,𝑚, and their second 
order influence on the spoke decision makers, expressed by 𝜏1𝜏𝑗(𝑥1,𝑚 − 𝑥1,𝑗). The 
second order influence of a spoke decision maker only adds to their relative importance 
if their effect on the hub decision maker (𝜏1𝑥1,𝑚) is greater than the other spoke decision 
maker’s influence on the hub decision maker (𝜏1𝑥1,𝑗).  
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4.3.2. Chain 
Suppose the decision makers are connected in a chain (see Figure 31), which 
implies that 
 
 
 
Figure 31. The network structure for the Chain configuration. 
 
𝑋 = (
0 1 0 0
𝑥2,1 0 𝑥2,3 0
0 𝑥3,2 0 𝑥3,4
0 0 1 0
). 
No single decision maker serves the central role of the hub in the Hub and Spoke 
configuration, but the two outer decision makers are less connected and the two inner 
decision makers more connected. 
Algebraic substitution of 𝑋 for the Chain configuration into (11) and simplification 
yields 𝑘𝑜1
′  equal to 
(1−𝜏1)(1−𝜏2𝜏3𝑥2,3𝑥3,2−𝜏3𝜏4𝑥3,4)𝑘𝑜1+𝜏1(1−𝜏2)(1−𝜏3𝜏4𝑥3,4)𝑘o2+𝜏1𝜏2𝑥2,3(1−𝜏3)𝑘o3+𝜏1𝜏2𝑥2,3𝜏3𝑥3,4(1−𝜏4)𝑘o4
1−𝜏1𝜏2𝑥2,1−𝜏3𝜏4𝑥3,4−𝜏2𝜏3𝑥2,3𝑥3,2+𝜏1𝜏2𝜏3𝜏4𝑥2,1𝑥3,4
 
(13a) 
and 𝑘𝑜2
′  equal to 
41 32
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(1−𝜏2)(1−𝜏3𝜏4𝑥3,4)𝑘o2+𝜏2𝑥2,1(1−𝜏1)(1−𝜏3𝜏4𝑥3,4)𝑘o1+𝜏2𝑥2,3(1−𝜏3)𝑘o3+𝜏2𝑥2,3𝜏3𝑥3,4(1−𝜏4)𝑘o4
1−𝜏1𝜏2𝑥2,1−𝜏3𝜏4𝑥3,4−𝜏2𝜏3𝑥2,3𝑥3,2+𝜏1𝜏2𝜏3𝜏4𝑥2,1𝑥3,4
. (13b) 
The form of 𝑘𝑜4
′ , the other outer decision maker, is symmetric to 𝑘𝑜1
′ , and the form 
of 𝑘𝑜3
′ , the other inner decision maker, is symmetric to 𝑘𝑜2
′ . The order of the terms in 
(16a) and (5b) show the nature of the direct and indirect influence on the extrinsic 
weights. 
In calculating 𝑘𝑜1
′  in (13a), decision maker 1’s own intrinsic weight is multiplied by 
a term proportional to (1 − 𝜏1)(1 − 𝜏2𝜏3𝑥2,3𝑥3,2 − 𝜏3𝜏4𝑥3,4), which represents decision 
maker 1’s reliance on their own opinion (1 − 𝜏1) and her resistance to second-order 
influence by other decision makers (1 − 𝜏2𝜏3𝑥2,3𝑥3,2 − 𝜏3𝜏4𝑥3,4); decision maker 2’s 
intrinsic weight is multiplied by a term proportional to 𝜏1(1 − 𝜏2)(1 − 𝜏3𝜏4𝑥3,4), which 
represents decision maker 1’s susceptibility to influence by other decision makers 𝜏1, 
decision maker 2’s reliance on their own opinion (1 − 𝜏2), and her resistance to second-
order influence by other decision makers (1 − 𝜏3𝜏4𝑥3,4); decision maker 3’s intrinsic 
weight is multiplied by a term proportional to 𝜏1𝜏2𝑥2,3(1 − 𝜏3), which represents decision 
maker 1 and 2’s susceptibility to influence by other decision makers 𝜏1 and 𝜏2, the 
influence of decision maker 3 on decision maker 2 𝑥2,3, and decision maker 3’s reliance 
on their own opinion (1 − 𝜏3); decision maker 4’s intrinsic weight is multiplied by a term 
proportional to 𝜏1𝜏2𝑥2,3𝜏3𝑥3,4(1 − 𝜏4)𝑘𝑜4, which represents decision maker 1, 2, and 3’s 
susceptibility to influence by other decision makers 𝜏1, 𝜏2, and 𝜏3, the influence of 
decision maker 4 on decision maker 3 and decision maker 3 on decision maker 2 𝑥3,4 
and 𝑥2,3, and decision maker 4’s reliance on her own opinion (1 − 𝜏4).  
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In calculating 𝑘𝑜2
′  in (13b), decision maker 2’s own intrinsic weight is multiplied by 
a term proportional to (1 − 𝜏2)(1 − 𝜏3𝜏4𝑥3,4), which represents decision maker 2’s 
reliance on their own opinion (1 − 𝜏2) and their resistance to second-order influence by 
other decision makers (1 − 𝜏3𝜏4𝑥3,4); decision maker 1’s intrinsic weight is multiplied by 
a term proportional to 𝜏2𝑥2,1(1 − 𝜏1)(1 − 𝜏3𝜏4𝑥3,4), which represents decision maker 2’s 
susceptibility to influence by other decision makers 𝜏2, the influence of decision maker 1 
on decision maker 2 𝑥2,1, decision maker 1’s reliance on their own opinion (1 − 𝜏1), and 
her resistance to second-order influence by other decision makers (1 − 𝜏3𝜏4𝑥3,4); 
decision maker 3’s intrinsic weight is multiplied by a term proportional to 𝜏2𝑥2,3(1 − 𝜏3), 
which represents decision maker 2’s susceptibility to influence by other decision makers 
𝜏2, the influence of decision maker 3 on decision maker 2 𝑥2,3, decision maker 3’s 
reliance on their own opinion (1 − 𝜏3); decision maker 4’s intrinsic weight is multiplied 
by a term proportional to 𝜏2𝑥2,3𝜏3𝑥3,4(1 − 𝜏4), which represents decision maker 2 and 3’s 
susceptibility to influence by other decision makers 𝜏2 and 𝜏3, the influence of decision 
maker 4 on decision maker 3 and decision maker 3 on decision maker 2 𝑥3,4 and 𝑥2,3, 
decision maker 4’s reliance on her own opinion (1 − 𝜏4). 
4.4. Interpretation of the results of stakeholder network examination: 
Reliance on own opinion 𝟏 − 𝝉𝒎:  As the decision-maker’s reliance on her own 
judgement directionally increases her extrinsic weight will decrease.  The greater her 
self-reliance, the less weight (extrinsic) she has as a member of the group.  This is 
directionally true for all network configurations; however, the change is not linear. 
Especially for the lower values of 𝜏𝑚, the vales of 𝑘 will range greatly across the 
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changes in 𝑘’.   The reliance a decision-maker puts on her own opinion can have a 
dramatic effect on the weight she has in the group decision.  At a low reliance on her 
own opinion, the decision-maker can have a very different extrinsic weight based on her 
intrinsic weight.  With a high opinion of her opinion, decision-maker will have very little 
impact on her extrinsic weight no matter her intrinsic weight. 
Impact of Intrinsic Weight (k): Generally, the higher a decision-makers intrinsic 
weight the higher her extrinsic weight will be.  Additionally, a higher extrinsic weight will 
have impact on those decision-makers that adjacent to the decision-maker.  This means 
the network configuration will have an impact on the relative extrinsic weights on the 
decision-makers.  A well-connected, high-intrinsic weight decision-maker will lower the 
extrinsic weights of those decision-makers around her and increase her own extrinsic 
weight. 
Implications:  Location of decision-makers and broader stakeholders in a 
network as well as the network configuration itself can impact the relative weights of the 
decision-makers and ultimately the choice of alternatives. Decision-makers and 
stakeholders can alter the outcome by making connections in the network that allow a 
stronger intrinsic weight decision-maker to have greater influence on the decision by 
lowering the extrinsic weights of the adjacent decision-makers.  
4.5. Characterizing the influence of stakeholders 
We use the notion of Betweenness Centrality as described by Bonacich (2012) to 
examine the overall network in a more general form.  Betweenness Centrality is based 
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on geodesics (shortest paths) between nodes and is calculated through the following 
steps: 
1. For each of the (n-1)(n-2)/2 pairs {𝑗, 𝑘} of nodes that do not include the subject 
node 𝑚, add all of the geodesics connecting 𝑗 and 𝑘 that include 𝑚. 
2. For each of the (n-1)(n-2)/2 pairs {𝑗, 𝑘} of vertices that do include the subject 
vertex 𝑚, add all of the geodesics connecting 𝑗 and 𝑘 that do not include 𝑚. 
3. Take the ratio of the two values and add up all of these ratios. 
This sum is the closeness centrality of vertex 𝑚. 
We make the calculations for the five-node network structure in Figure 32 and 
then tabulate them below in Table 3 or order to make a comparison between the nodes.   
Table 3. Betweenness Centrality of Five Node Example. 
Node 1 
 2 3 4 5 
2 X 1/2 0/1 0/1 
3 X X 0/1 0/1 
4 X X X 0/1 
5 X X X X 
= 0.5 
Node 4 
 1 2 3 5 
1 X 0/1 0/1 2/2 
2 X X 1/2 1/1 
Node 2 
 1 3 4 5 
1 X 0/1 1/2 1/2 
3 X X 0/1 0/1 
4 X X X 0/1 
5 X X X X 
= 1 
Node 5 
 1 2 3 4 
1 X 0/1 0/1 0/2 
2 X X 0/2 0/1 
Node 3 
 1 2 4 5 
1 X 0/1 1/2 1/2 
2 X X 0/1 0/1 
4 X X X 0/1 
5 X X X X 
= 1 
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3 X X X 1/1 
5 X X X X 
= 3.5 
3 X X X 0/1 
4 X X X X 
= 0 
This shows a calculated value for each vertex with vertex 4 being the highest.  Given its 
location in the Stakeholder Network this follows intuition.   
 
Figure 32. A five-node network structure. 
 
We make a modification of the Betweenness Centrality to create the Strength 
Centrality.  The same procedure is followed but the addition of each geodesic is 
replaced with the addition of each geodesic multiplied by its strength factor, 𝑥𝑚,𝑗.  To 
make the calculations more evident, we count every length of the geodesic not just the 
addition of the geodesic.  This can be shown to be exactly equal to taking a proportion. 
The calculations are better seen in a series of tables one for each node.  For this study, 
we set all of the connections at a strength of 1.0 except for the connections between 
Edward Cook Draft Dissertation April 2019 
 
 
16 
 
node 3 and 4 (𝑥34 = 0.2).  This is simply to show the impact that the strength of 
connection has on the weighting influence between stakeholders.  
 
Table 4. Strength Centrality of the Five Node Example. 
 Node 1 
 2 3 4 5 
2 X 2/3.2 0/1 0/2 
3 X X 0/0.2 0/1.2 
4 X X X 0/1 
5 X X X X 
= 0.625 
Node 4 
 1 2 3 5 
1 X 0/1 1/0 5.2/5.2 
2 X X 2/3.2 1/1 
3 X X X 1.2/1.2 
5 X X X X 
= 3.625 
 
Node 2 
 1 3 4 5 
1 X 0/1 2/3.2 3/5.2 
3 X X 0/0.2 0/1.2 
4 X X X 0/1 
5 X X X X 
= 1.2 
Node 5 
 1 2 3 4 
1 X 0/1 0/1 0/3.2 
2 X X 0/3.2 0/1 
3 X X X 0/1 
4 X X X X 
= 0 
 
Node 3 
 1 2 4 5 
1 X 0/1 2/3.2 2.2/5.2 
2 X X 0/1 0/2 
4 X X X 0/1 
5 X X X X 
= 1.2 
 
With only one connection in the network that is not at 100% strength, (𝑥34 = 0.2), 
there is still significant change in the Strength Centrality in all but the fifth node.  This 
change is not seen in the Betweenness Centrality since it is counting only the existence 
of the connection not the strength of the connection.  
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We can apply this method to the two examples above, the Hub and Spoke 
(Figure 30) and the Chain (Figure 31) in order to determine their Strength Centrality.  
Table 5. Strength Centrality for Hub and Spoke. 
 Node 1 (Hub) 
 2 3 4 
2 X 1/1 1/1 
3 X X 1/1 
4 X X X 
  = 3 
 
Nodes 2,3,4 (Spoke) 
 1 3 4 
1 X 0/1 0/1 
3 X X 0/1 
4 X X X 
= 0 
Since all of the connections are through the center only Node 1 has any Strength 
Centrality no matter what the strength of the connections are between each of the 
nodes.  This does not mean that the decision-maker at Node 1 (Hub) will carry more 
weight in the group. As the study above showed in addition to the number of 
connections and their strength, the decision-maker’s weight will also be influenced by 
her reliance on her own opinion versus that of all other decision-makers.  What this 
does, however, show is that for the decision-makers on the spokes of the network, the 
influence from all other decision-makers is moderated by the decision-maker at the hub.  
This is fairly evident from the network’s simplicity but would be far less so with more 
decision-makers (nodes) and more connections with varied strengths. 
Table 6 below shows the example of the Chain which has different Strength 
Centrality profile than the Hub and Spoke of Figure 30. 
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Table 6. Strength Centrality for Chain. 
 Node 1 (Left Outer) 
 2 3 4 
2 X 0/1 0/1 
3 X X 0/1 
4 X X X 
  = 0 
Node 3 (R. Inner) 
 1 2 4 
1 X 0/1 1/1 
2 X X 1/1 
4 X X X 
= 2 
 
Node 2 (L. Inner) 
 1 3 4 
1 X 1/1 1/1 
3 X X 0/1 
4 X X X 
= 2 
Node 4 (Right Outer) 
 1 2 3 
1 X 0/1 0/1 
2 X X 0/1 
3 X X X 
= 0 
 
The Strength Centrality measure is now split between the two inner nodes 
(decision-makers).  As we saw above the influence of the other stakeholders on the two 
outer nodes (decision-makers) is moderated through the two inner nodes immediately 
adjacent to each outer node.  The Strength Centrality measure shows this easily since 
all of the strength of the network is concentrated in those two nodes. 
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4.6. Returning to the Motivating Example 
We now return to the original example of the dissertation in Chapter 2.  We 
described a group decision with six stakeholders Branch, Operations, Fraud, IT, 
Compliance, and Risk.  The configuration of the network is shown in Figure 33 below. 
 
Figure 33. The network configuration of the six stakeholders from the bank 
example. 
 
We elicited weights on five main objectives: 
1. Minimize Cost Beyond Budget 
2. Minimize Time to Completion 
3. Minimize Associate Reputation 
4. Maintain Brand 
5. Minimize Delay in Realized Value 
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The elicitations were performed individually with each executive, allowing them to 
state their intrinsic weights. However, at the beginning of the program they did not want 
to share their weights because of a lack of trust in the group. We can now explore the 
question: What would the influence of the other stakeholders have been if the 
stakeholders had been forced to perform the elicitation in a group setting?  
Based on knowledge of the executives involved, we estimated the connection 
matrix to be 
𝑋 =
(
  
 
0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1
. 15 0 0.3 . 15 0.1 0.3
0.8 0.2 0 0 0 0
0.4 0.4 0 0 0.05 0.15
0.5 0.4 0.1 0 0 0
0.45 0.45 0.1 0 0 0 )
  
 
 
As an example, we also estimated their susceptibility to influence based on the 
corporate culture 
𝑇 =
(
  
 
0.7 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.5 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.5 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.4 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.3 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.6)
  
 
 
The matrix (𝐼 − 𝑇𝑋)−1(1 − 𝑇) in equation 11 used to derive the extrinsic weights from 
the intrinsic weights is (to two decimal places) is given below: 
(𝐼 − 𝑇𝑋)−1(1 − 𝑇) =
(
  
 
0.38 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.08 0.06
0.08 0.57 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.08
0.16 0.12 0.57 0.08 0.04 0.03
0.08 0.13 0.05 0.65 0.04 0.05
0.07 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.72 0.02
0.13 0.20 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.44)
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Table 7 shows the weights elected from the executives on each top-level 
objective. Table 8 shows the extrinsic weights calculated from the intrinsic weights in 
Table 7 using the network model and our estimated 𝑋 and 𝑇.  
 
Table 7. The weights elicited from the corporate stakeholders. 
 
Minimize 
Delay in 
Realized 
Value 
Minimize 
Cost Beyond 
Budget 
Maintain 
Associate 
Reputations 
Minimize 
Time to 
Completion 
Maintain 
Brand 
Branch 35% 25% 20% 15% 5% 
Operations 35% 25% 20% 15% 5% 
IT 35% 25% 20% 15% 5% 
Fraud 60% 10% 10% 15% 5% 
Compliance 35% 10% 5% 25% 25% 
Risk 60% 10% 5% 5% 20% 
 
Table 8. The extrinsic weights for the corporate stakeholders from the network 
model. 
 
Minimize 
Delay in 
Realized 
Value 
Minimize 
Cost Beyond 
Budget 
Maintain 
Associate 
Reputations 
Minimize 
Time to 
Completion 
Maintain 
Brand 
Branch 41.0% 20.3% 16.2% 15.2% 7.4% 
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Operations 39.4% 21.5% 17.0% 14.8% 7.3% 
IT 37.8% 22.8% 18.2% 15.0% 6.2% 
Fraud 52.5% 13.9% 12.2% 14.9% 6.5% 
Compliance 36.9% 13.0% 8.3% 22.0% 19.7% 
Risk 48.8% 16.1% 11.7% 11.0% 12.4% 
Figure 34 shows the weights in Tables 7 and 8 as a line plot, revealing the real 
change in the weights when influenced by the social network. The extrinsic weights 
showed considerably less variance than the intrinsic weights, an effect that gives the 
impression of agreement as the stakeholders are not revealing their true preferences. 
This is significant and reveals one of the keys to the successful implementation of the 
decision described in Chapter 2.  If the executives had been asked to state their weights 
in public, then they would have been subject to the social pressure inherent in the 
corporate culture to move toward a more consensus view without having actually had 
the conversation.  They would anticipate what the weights should be.  The level of trust 
which became critical to the success of the effort had not yet been built.   
The difference in extrinsic weights from the intrinsic weights are significant and 
reveal the complexity in the interplay between the stakeholders as a result of the 
network configuration and the strength of their connections.  As the ability of the 
executives to communicate improved inside of the program management structure to 
which they were comfortable, expressing ideas that were uncomfortable became more 
effective across the group.  That trust would not have been built nearly as easily if the 
elicitation had been performed in a group setting.  Individual elicitation was important for 
getting the fuller picture of how the executives thought about the objective weights.  The 
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ability of the fourth alternative to have arisen would have been dramatically diminished 
because the impact of the other alternatives on the objectives for some of the 
stakeholders would have been lost.  
 
 
Figure 34. A Comparison of the Intrinsic and Extrinsic Weights of Each 
Stakeholder. 
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Returning to the Strength Centrality idea we can apply that to this five Node 
model of the stakeholders for our motivating example.  We see those calculations in 
Table 9. Note the symmetry that we had before is gone, since strength of the 
connections between the bank stakeholders are no longer symmetrical.  The tables 
read from row to column to indicate the strength of connections between two 
stakeholders.  We see that the basic results we had achieved I the matrix analysis come 
through her as well.  The Info Tech stakeholder because of relative isolation in the 
network has less influence than the other stakeholders.  Risk and Compliance are also 
relatively low but not from their placement in the network but rather the relatively weaker 
connections that they have to the other stakeholders.  Branch and Operations dominate 
because of both position and relative strength of connection.  Unlike the ameliorating 
effective that we see as we calculated the extrinsic weights graphed in Figure 22, we 
again see the disparate strength that a subset of the stakeholders has and therefore the 
value of a private elicitation of weights. 
4.7. Contributions from Stakeholder Network Analysis 
This stakeholder network model provides an understanding of the decision-power 
of each stakeholder based on that stakeholder’s connection to other stakeholders as 
compared to an assessment either collectively by the stakeholders or an outside 
decision analyst. The Strength Centrality measure provides a way to understand to what 
extent that decision-power is manifest in the weighting of the decision-makers.  This 
model also implies that decision strength can change as the network changes.   
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Table 9. The Strength Centrality of the real example of the bank implementation. 
 
Stakeholders can change their influence on the decision by making better and 
stronger connections to other stakeholders thereby increasing their weighting in the 
group decision-making process.  This change can alter the extrinsic weight of a 
stakeholder even though their intrinsic weight remains the same.  This model also 
shows the impact that susceptibility to influence by others will have on extrinsic weight.  
As others are perceived to be more expert in a particular objective, the extrinsic weight 
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of a stakeholder will change.  Their extrinsic weight (true weight) is a function of three 
things: their position power, their strength of connections in the network, and their 
susceptibility to influence by others in the network. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusions 
This work began (Chapter 2) as an application of a practical business decision: 
how “best” to rollout a complex, banking technology and process change to 10,000 
employees across a 1000-branch network.  It developed into a practical utilization of the 
latest thinking in group decision-making as encapsulated by Keeney (2013) but included 
important work from several others.  We started with Freeman (1980), which originated 
Stakeholder Theory, and employed those ideas to increase the breadth of stakeholder 
groups that would be included in the multi-stakeholder decision. Freeman (1980) 
pointed toward the multi-objective, multi-stakeholder decision analysis construct as an 
appropriate use of Stakeholder Theory.  We benefited from this insight by using it in a 
business group decision context.  Values elicitation was done following Bond et al. 
(2008, 2010) but done in the context of typical business program meetings which were a 
comfortable format for the stakeholders engaged in the effort.  From these elicitations, 
we developed multi-attribute utility functions for each stakeholder group. Because we 
suspected the presence of utility dependence, we followed Abbas (2011) and developed 
a utility function for stakeholders by creating utility trees. All of this culminated with 
employing the group decision-making approach in Keeney (2013).  With this approach 
we developed a group utility function that increased buy-in from the stakeholders 
because of the transparency of the process. To help highlight the group impact of the 
possible alternatives, we relied on value-gap analysis methods (Merrick et al. 2005, 
Feng and Keller 2006) and used those methods to create a stakeholder value-gap 
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analysis.  The ultimate success of this analysis was to spur the group to create a new 
alternative that was an improvement over the original alternative set.  A multi-objective, 
multi-stakeholder approach to decision-making took the stakeholders to a far more 
nuanced and robust decision-making process but resulted in a superior outcome than 
that achieved by three previous banks who had attempted to implement the same 
system and process changes.  
Based on what was learned from the interactions of the stakeholders in the bank, 
we explored the formation of a model (Section 4) that would capture the “Cost of 
Conflict” for a group decision, if the decision-makers employed a noncooperative 
approach.  The key component of this approach was to model the objectives using 
game theory.  This required generalizing the one assumption that Keeney (2013) left as 
specific, decision-makers holding the alternatives in common.  Instead, decision-makers 
could hold different alternatives.  Those alternatives were used as the strategies in a 
game context where the normal form game was used to model the objective.  The 
payoffs were the subjective utilities that each decision-maker held for that objective 
against their individually desired alternatives.   
We examined nine different game forms and matched them in pairs through the 
possible combinations in order to understand where the “Cost of Conflict” would arise.  
Using the Nash equilibrium as our solution concept, we found that, in every pairing in 
some part of the weighting space, there was a “Cost of Conflict” meaning that the 
optimal solution would not be chosen consistently because the two decision-makers 
could land on a Nash equilibrium whose weighted payoff for the group was less than 
another possibility.  We further explored the behavior of this modeling with game theory 
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by examining the behavior with three, four, and five objectives modeled as games.   By 
randomly selecting the games and the weighting placed by each decision-maker on 
each objective, we could look at the distribution of “Cost of Conflict” outcomes.  We 
found that the range decreased as the number of objectives considered increased, 
implying that the increased number of objectives mitigated the “Cost of Conflict” from 
other objectives.  All of these insights point toward further research into how the 
dynamics of group decision-making can be better modeled by employing other insights 
from game theory such as repeated games and information asymmetry.  With this better 
modeling, practical applications can be developed that would aid in improving group 
decisions. 
Returning to the core idea of Freeman (1980), we take up the examination of 
stakeholder interaction (Chapter 4) as a way to better determine the weighting of each 
decision-maker in the group decision.  In the group decision for the bank system rollout, 
swing-weights, as described by Keeney and Raifa (1976), were used as a method to 
determine decision-maker weighting.  By moving to network theory, we could create a 
measure of decision-maker weighting by understanding the “importance” of that 
decision-maker through the connections to other decision-makers.  We further expand 
the frame by including the impact to a decision-makers importance by the other 
stakeholders who do not have decision rights but nevertheless have meaningful 
influence on the decision-makers.  This is a further expansion of Keeney (2013) in that 
only decision-makers were considered in the formulation of the multi-objective multi-
stakeholder model.  We defined an extrinsic (true weight) of a stakeholder based on 
their intrinsic, which we suggest can come form their position power, and the 
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connections they have to all other stakeholders.  We defined a measure of the power of 
any one stakeholder by understanding their Strength Centrality, which gives an 
indication of the power of their position in the network.  We solve for the extrinsic weight 
through our construct of Intrinsic weight, network connection, and susceptibility to 
influence. 
The overall contributions from this work are first in the creation of a practical 
approach to implementing a group decision which, by following the construct of Keeney 
(2013), avoids Arrow’s Paradox as described by Arrow (1951).  This set of steps can be 
repeated for other complex group decisions which might otherwise literally experience 
“The Dictator” that Arrow (1951) describes.  A consequence of Arrow’s Paradox is that 
evaluations of alternatives do not reflect the values of the group, and potentially superior 
alternatives never surface as they did in the example from Chapter 2.  The two 
conceptual components of this work, the use of game theory to model objectives and 
network theory to model decision-maker weighting, also point toward practical 
application for group decision-making.   
Modeling objectives as games, requires the relaxation of the need for decision-
makers to hold alternatives in common.  As a result, the frame of the analysis is more 
fully open and allows the modeling of more complex decision problems.  It also shows 
that there is an inherent possibility of group utility loss (Cost of Conflict) if the decision-
makers have not committed to a fully cooperative approach.  This commitment to full 
cooperation requires more interaction, than contemplated by Keeney (2013) and others, 
between the decision-makers to reveal the “Cost of Conflict” and chose the Paretto 
solution.      
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Modeling the interactions of stakeholders as a way to understand the weighting 
of decision-makers not only recognizes the difference between stakeholders and 
decision-makers, but also indicates a more quantifiable method of choosing decision-
maker weighting.  
Further research can explore the application of more aspects of both game 
theory and network analysis to group decision-making and thereby reveal ways to 
model other complexities of human decision interaction.  This work has shown that 
there is value in using the techniques of those disciplines to understand better group 
decision-making and with those techniques implement better decisions.   
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